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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



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ARMED FORCES

MAJ GEN BEZNOSHCHENKO ON PRE-DRAFT TRAINING IN MOLDAVIYA

Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 27 Feb 85 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen S. Beznoshchenko: "The Soldier's Obligation"]

[Text] Every year, young replacements enter the Soviet Army and Navy. Yesterday's workers, kolkhoz farmers, and students take a military oath of loyalty to the Motherland.

The Constitution of the USSR states: "The duty of the USSR's Armed Forces before the people is to defend reliably their socialist Fatherland and remain at a constant state of combat readiness so as to guarantee an immediate blow against any aggressor."

In order to execute this duty with dignity and honor, it is necessary to master thoroughly both equipment and tactics, be strong, tempered, courageous, steadfast and willful. Even before the army, however, the future soldier has to undergo a basic and comprehensive political, moral, technical and physical preparation.

Experience shows: those collectives where the training of future soldiers is approached creatively, and where the party and Komsomol organizations have solid contacts with the committees of DOSAAF, sport and other social organizations, the inductees enter more quickly into the rhythm of everyday soldier life after having arrived in the service.

All-Union marches to the places of the revolutionary, combat and labor glory of the Soviet people, the para-military games of Zarnitsa and Orlenok, and military-patriotic clubs have a positive influence on the preparation of young people for the service. The universities and clubs of the future soldiers, which introduce young people to the study of the basics of military affairs and the glorious traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces, are gaining more and more popularity.

Our republic has opened many military-sporting camps where young men master military-technical specialties and are physically tempered. Athletic meets for pre-inductees and inductees are conducted regularly in Ready for Labor

and the Defense of the USSR (GTO) sporting competitions, the quality and effectiveness of the learning-training process in the collectives' physical education sections, the training groups of DOSAAF's primary organizations and the centers for initial military training have been enhanced.

From year to year, high indices in the republic's socialist competition in the preparation of young people for military service are being achieved in Kishinev, Tirapole, and Bendery, as well as in the Rybnitsskiy, Novoanenskiy, Yedinetsskiy and Floreshtski rayons. This is facilitated by the constant and ubiquitous military-patriotic and defense-mass work among young people conducted under the direction of party gorkoms and raykoms and local Soviet agencies. This work has been especially intensified with regard to the preparations for the 40th anniversary of our Great Victory.

For example, in Kishinev, a coordinating council on military-patriotic work was set up; one of the party's raykom secretaries heads it. Future plans for the council's work, as well as a combined report on the year's results, are being listened to and confirmed at a meeting of the raykom bureau.

A major military-patriotic effort is being conducted by the party organization of the furniture factory imeni M.V. Frunze. For its successes in the preparation of young people for service in the Soviet Army and Navy, the enterprise's collective was awarded the intermittent Red Banner of the ispolkom of the city Soviet of people's deputies. Here is located one of the republic's best unified training centers for pre-induction preparation. Not one of the young male workers of the factory does not leave for the army without having acquired a military specialty or mastered the art of accurate fire.

A good training-exercise base has been set up in Kishinev's Moldavgidromash Association. Here, a center for initial military preparation has been set up and numerous sporting sections have been opened where future soldiers exercise. Every year before induction, they undergo training according to a special program, a major part of which is dedicated to shooting competitions, light athletics and swimming.

The tasks of the military-patriotic education and preparation of young people for service in the Armed Forces are constantly supervised by party and Komsomol committees and the plant committee from the Tiraspole plant, Elektromarsh. Frequent guests of the enterprise's young people are former frontline soldiers. Various sport holidays for the athletic meets of pre-inductees, mass competitions and tournaments dedicated to Soviet Army Day and Victory Day and gatherings of participants in a march to the places of national glory, which inculcate a deep respect for the Motherland's heroic history, have become traditions.

The preparation of inductees in learning institutions has improved noticeably. The majority of graduates of secondary schools include many who are foremost in athletics and sports with official ratings and recognition. The material base is also improving: smallbore ranges have been built in many cities and

villages through the efforts of the students themselves and sports grounds have been equipped. An excellent smallbore range, for example, was built by the school children of a village in the Mant Kagul'skiy rayon: Written off ferro-concrete pipes were utilized for this purpose. After these school children had shown the way, people in other villages of the rayon constructed similar ranges.

The soldiers of the Red Banner Odessa Military District maintain close ties with the workers of the republic's industrial enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. They often visit shops, building sites and schools, they meet with pre-inductees and tell them about their everyday lives and living conditions, and about the difficulties for which they need to prepare beforehand.

I would also want to speak about the shortcomings in the work of several organizations dealing with the military preparation of young men. These organizations are primarily interested in the physical tempering of the inductees. Because of the lack of initiative and non-involvement of individual directors of sport committees and Voluntary Sports Society (DSO) councils, there are still no smallbore ranges, the simplest of sports grounds or any athletic centers in a number of training centers. There are also no visual aids propagandizing the physical education of the GTO complex; no areas have been established at the reservoirs for swimming.

According to available data, it also happens that almost all young men being called up for service are regarded as having passed the norms of the GTO complex. Tests show that a number of the inductees cannot manage to deal with these norms.

The level of physical preparation of young men from the Lazovskiy, Ungenskiy, Suvorovskiy, Kaushanskiy and a number of other rayons is still quite low.

Twice a year, the army and navy receive young replacements. Yesterday's school children, young kolkhoz farmers and workers join the family of soldiers and we must strive to see to it that they are well prepared for army service and that they become worthy successors of the glorious heroic traditions of the older generation.

12247

CSO: 1801/178

ARMED FORCES

MAJ GEN KRUCHKOV ON COMPUTERS, TROOP CONTROL, TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 85 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Yu. Kruchkov, professor and doctor of technical sciences:
"The Commander at the Computer's Keyboard"/

[Text] Computer science is currently the key element in industrial production, scientific research, and modern as well as future weapons and military equipment systems. An important factor in enhancing unit and subunit combat readiness is sound knowledge and skill in the utilization of computer equipment on the part of the officer corps.

Only the brief reports of the students, their commands and the comments of the instructor disturb the silence of the academic auditorium. The soft, flickering light of the display screens reflects on the concentrated faces of the officers who are sitting at the computer desks. They are directing a "battle" whose course is being simulated by the computers. The pre-arranged "enemies" are divided by only a narrow aisle between the desks. Columns of numbers on the screens, graphics and text fragments show the changes in the situation in sufficient detail as decisions are implemented and the "enemy" responds.

Having interrupted the course of the game, the instructor conducts a critique of the commander's and staff's actions. The information, recorded by the computer's teletype, provides a rather complete depiction of what happened. Utilization of the computers during the critique permits a thorough analysis of various decision alternatives and their comparison, as well as an evaluation of the effectiveness of the corresponding measures...

The command and control of forces under the conditions of modern combat is inconceivable without the extensive utilization of computer equipment. Data processing, the carrying out of various computations and the evaluation of the effectiveness of this or that decision require a considerable expenditure of time. It is here that it is difficult to overestimate the computer's role. However, the automation of troop and weapons command and control is a complex problem. Along with this problem's technical aspect, one has to understand distinctly the peculiarities of man-machine interaction. This includes program software, the training of specialists in the required skills, and the provision that officers are fully knowledgeable in computer operations.

The creation of microprocessors is leading to a new phase in the automation of command and control. The miniature versatile systems are capable of qualitatively changing the characteristics of weapons and the means of command and control. This, of course, changes how commanders and staffs direct operations. Data-search systems permit the quick retrieval of necessary information. Abroad, they are working on the idea of creating a mechanical consultant which would assist commanders at all levels, as well as staff and rear services officers. In the future, such consultants will be able to update the specialized memory of microcomputers, found in the military commander's field kit, over conventional communications channels. During field operations, he will be provided with the opportunity, depending on the current situation, to make the necessary computations and receive the required data to make a decision. They assume that electronic consultants, built on the basis of information-logic systems, will be able to take on a portion of the creative nature of working out a decision.

Present-generation large computers can be utilized to build large problem-oriented simulator systems. These systems permit the formation of a simulator model of the combat operations of virtually any scope. Connected to enormous data banks, the mechanical model will provide the opportunity to conduct extensive research into the process of combat operations with the objective of evaluating their effectiveness, selecting efficient methods of conducting combat, analyzing the enemy's action, etc.

An important aspect of the automation of force command and control is the interface of man and computer, i.e., the shift from a passive routine whereby the man only enters data into the computer and receives a finished product to operational interaction with the computer. A man-computer dialogue is particularly effective. In the future, this dialogue will be conducted in a natural, or close to natural language.

I must mention that definite successes have been noted recently in the creation of artificial intelligence. I am not talking here about phenomenal robots capable of replacing people, but about means which, one way or another, enhance or expand people's intellectual capabilities.

The creation of program software for computer equipment requires special considerations. A computer without a program is only "an empty brain," an expensive, but worthless instrument. Hence the need to set up the mass industrial production of programs with current state-of-the-art expertise. The effective utilization of computers in force command and control and weapons systems will largely be determined by how well we solve this problem. It is well-known that modern technology permits the construction of an average-size computer in several hours. Months of tedious collective efforts on the part of programmers, however, are required for the creation of the computer's program software. Specialists in the military sciences, the theory of command and control, information programmers, research into computer operations, systems analysis, effectiveness theory, engineering psychology, ergonomics, etc. are also required.

I must emphasize that the mathematical modeling of combat operations is only a means for working out a decision. The commander maintains the right to make this or that decision and continues to bear total responsibility. Will he, the commander, trust the most perfect computer if he is unfamiliar with the modeling process itself, or that totality of factors which is taught by the model's creators, the limiting factors and assumptions, the general principles of setting up computer algorithms, etc?

The issue is not as simple as it may appear at first glance. Sometimes, a dilemma arises with regard to a responsible decision: Is it not better to act in accordance with acquired experience and personal intuition than to trust something unfamiliar? Such is man's psychology, and it can be understood. But we cannot justify a situation where a highly effective instrument is not utilized at a decisive (and I do mean "decisive" in the literal sense of the word) moment. The very consequences of this can be quite serious.

In preparing his decision, the commander needs to know how to participate actively in the modeling of combat operations and how to work closely with other specialists; he must organize and direct their work to reveal the issues which interest him as he creatively makes his decision. For this, he must know the principles and methods of modeling combat operations, be skilled in evaluating their effectiveness, and know how to work with algorithms, the basics of problem programming and, of course, the capabilities of computer equipment. Such is the requirement we face today.

Total knowledge of computers on the part of the officer corps is the necessary prerequisite in knowing how to utilize a computer in solving those important problems facing units and ships today. The utilization of new combat equipment, complex weapons systems and automated force command and control systems is inconceivable without this knowledge. One must keep in mind that every future combat system and every future "officer's slot" will be equipped with data processing computers.

One hears the opinion nowadays that it is sufficient to teach the entire officer corps programming in order to ensure the total knowledge of computers. In our opinion, the issue is not this, nor even this, alone. Computer knowledge, and this is logical, assumes a deep understanding of the capabilities of computer equipment and its software, as well as that one possesses sound skills in utilizing the computer in an area associated with an officer's basic service activity. This, however, is also insufficient. One also needs to master a specific pattern of thinking in order to utilize effectively a computer's capabilities in any interaction and interface. I am talking here about a formalized representation of the processes and features which have to be replaced by mathematical models as they are brought about in the computer. An individual knowledgeable in computers is distinguished by his utmost precise definiteness, simplicity, mathematical discipline in formulation, and the know-how to express a complicated idea with the aid of a limited number of resources.

The differentiations of the know-how in the field of computer technology and its utilization for military purposes present a number of pressing problems for organizations tasked with education at military schools. The training of command staff and engineering personnel constantly requires a comprehensive introduction of computer science on a unified methodological basis in the learning process. All learning disciplines need to be coordinated around the methodological concept of computer utilization in the professional activity of the military specialist.

Currently, a definite amount of experience has been accumulated. Practice shows convincingly that computer utilization results in the substantial intensification of the learning process and the enhancement of its effectiveness. In our opinion, it is also important here that uniform systematic principles covering the comprehensive introduction of computers in the combat training of troops be worked out. At the initial stage of the solution of this problem, it would be expedient to establish at major military institutions of learning ongoing learning-systematic school seminars for officers from the forces.

The lesson concluded. The display screens went blank. But the excitement was still evident on the faces of the students, participants in the command and staff training exercise. An animated discussion of mutual actions, untried variants and suggestions takes place; interesting comments are also made on the nature of psychological factors. It is noted that the situation perceived on the screen and the reaction to the trainees' actions are close to reality; this also creates a psychological backdrop. The same thing does not happen when a referee provides lead-in instructions in accordance with a plan compiled beforehand and supervises only the actions on the part of the trainees and not the results of these actions. It seems that this is but another problem, deserving serious attention, in a long row of problems put to us by the computer.

12247

CSO: 1801/138

ARMED FORCES

EDITORIAL ENCOURAGES MASTERY OF CURRENT WEAPONS

Moscow KARASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 85 p 1

[Article: "Skillfully Handle Weapons and Equipment"]

[Text] To reliably defend the peaceful constructive labor of the Soviet people and the great achievements of socialism, the Communist Party and the Soviet government constantly ensure that the Soviet Armed Forces are equipped with everything necessary.

Today the army and navy are armed with strategic and operational-tactical missiles of various classes, supersonic aircraft, surface and subsurface ships, the most modern weapons, newest tanks and fighting vehicles and many other types of combat equipment and weapons. Their combat capabilities and high reliability make it possible to successfully accomplish the most complicated missions in any season, at any time of day, under any weather conditions, on land, in the air and at sea. But for this it is necessary to proficiently handle the weapons and combat equipment, and this is especially important in the present international situation which has been exacerbated by the aggressive circles of imperialism.

In the socialist competition under the slogan "To the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory, 27th Communist Party central Committee Congress--we dedicate our selfless military labor!," from the first day of the new training year our soldiers and sailors steadfastly improved their combat proficiency and struggled for unstintingly high quality accomplishment of military and political training plans and socialist responsibilities with one of the most important points being the study and mastery of weapons and combat equipment.

To reach proficiency with assigned weapons means to achieve such a level of knowledge and skill which allows maximum use of their capabilities to achieve victory in combat. The present summons is to hit the target with the first shot, the first burst, the first missile. Such skill is gained in field training and exercises, in flights and on cruises. Conducting them in situations which are as realistic as possible to actual combat conditions are a sure, reliable method of increasing soldier combat skill and weapons and combat equipment proficiency. Important indicators in combat training is the ability to accomplish tasks and meet standards with a reduced crew or section and specialist cross-training. Each supervisor must remember: every

indulgence in training and exercises slows down the development of soldier skills to effective weapons use and leads to an unacceptable waste of resources.

Weapons and combat equipment proficiency is impossible without well-organized soldier technical training. In the past training year the air defense missile battalion commanded by Maj M. Kopin (Far Eastern Military District) received a low evaluation during the tactical exercise with live fire. This was due to a lack of knowledge of assigned weapons on the part of some specialists. Commanders, their deputies for armament and material, staff officers and other officers who are responsible for the organization of technical training must give constant attention to the efficient use of training time available for this purpose and the methodological skill of the supervisors of these classes. They are correct in those units and on those ships where they actively control the work, organize technical study groups, conduct technical conferences, generalize and spread the experience of Masters of Military Affairs and winners of socialist competitions.

The most important indicator of the level of soldier combat proficiency is his specialist qualification level. The struggle for high qualifications is the struggle for high combat readiness. A matter of honor for each soldier is rising to new heights of military skill and absolutely fulfilling his obligation to attain a higher qualification level. For this to happen all the necessary conditions must be created in each unit and on each ship. In some places it is possible to see high qualifications for the personnel in a unit but low results in training and combat missions. This is an obvious result of simplification in the training and it is necessary to decisively counter this.

Combat equipment and weapons proficiency demands improvement in methods of operation and the mastery and development of modern tactics. Receptivity to innovation and a constant search for more effective combat results to achieve victory not with weapons but with skill must be an inherent characteristic of all soldiers, but primarily officers. For this purpose it is necessary to create such tactical situations in classes and training which stimulate creativity and courageous and audacious decisions using weapons and equipment to the limit of their tactical and technical capabilities.

Training aids make high combat equipment proficiency possible. Soldiers and sailors are equipped with the most modern firing range equipment, trainers, simulators and other technical means of training which are used to speed up specialist training and provide more economical expenditures of material resources. It is important that these expensive equipment and devices be used intensively for combat training and not stand in closed classrooms.

In solving the problems of gaining combat equipment and weapons proficiency, it is difficult to overestimate the role of party political work. The political organs, party and Komsomol organizations are called on to actively assist the commander in the struggle to raise the combat skill and qualification of the soldiers; communists and Komsomols must set the example. It is

important to take all steps to support and stimulate initiative and creativity of soldiers, to inculcate in them the high responsibility for proficiency with assigned weapons. Preparation for the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War creates especially useful possibilities for educating soldiers in combat traditions. It is important to make each serviceman understand that love for weapons and combat equipment, trust in their reliability, careful attention to and skillful use of them on the battlefield have always been innate characteristics of the Soviet soldier.

The Soviet people have entrusted the armed defenders of the Homeland with first class weapons and the most modern combat equipment. Weapons proficiency is the most important condition for maintaining the constant readiness of soldiers to accomplish any order for the defense of the Socialist Homeland and the gains of socialism.

12747

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1 May 1985

ARMED FORCES

AIRBORNE UNIT CRITICISED FOR CONSISTENT FAILURE IN TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Oliynik: "They Have Accustomed Themselves"]

[Text] "Overall, the competition in the unit's subunits has been organized. However, it has not become an inseparable part of the unit's training cycle. The majority of the subunits, like the unit failed to as a whole, meet its obligations."

(From the overall evaluation report of a certain airborne unit for the 1984 training year)

What prevented the airborne troops from reaching the goals they set to meet in competition? The report contains an answer even to this question: Primarily, the low quality of lesson conduct. The commission noted that some subunit commanders have not mastered advanced training methods, have problems in the organization of combat on the ground and superficially know the provisions of the combat manual, firing courses and leadership. The unit's training material and technical base does not correspond to current needs.

It is worth going over previous evaluation reports in order to see a clear pattern: Many of the shortcomings are still just the same. The list of these shortcomings literally moves from report to report. And just as regularly, the evaluators note omissions in the organization of competition. Not once in the past 4 years have the airborne troops succeeded in meeting their obligations. Has a change for the better been noted during the current training year?

We are at the unit's training center. According to today's training schedule, the personnel of Maj V. Yemei'yanov's battalion are conducting a firing exercise with authorized shells. The exercise is to be a test.

While we were still on the way to the firing range, we exchanged ideas with the senior officer for the supervision of the district's combat training, Col B. Ashikhmin. Allegedly, the airborne troops were lucky. The weather was ideal for firing, windless and sunny.

However, when we reached the range, we were met by a ringing silence. A single combat assault vehicle was sitting forlornly on the firing line. Several men were hustling around a second vehicle: they were trouble-shooting. A third vehicle, it turned out, failed to make it to the range.

The subunit began the exercise 3 hours late. Already with their first attempt, Capt L. Funikov and Sr Lt S. Pikkaraynen received unsatisfactory evaluations. They failed to hit even one target.

At this time, the unit commander, Col S. Obruchnev, arrived at the range. He talked with the personnel there, he chided the laggards and tried to inspire those who still had to fire. This did not help. Little effort was made to perform the exercise. Knowledge, skill and psychological confidence are necessary. Very few gunners were successful in receiving satisfactory evaluations. We also failed to see any traces of competition organization. The airborne troops did not make any commitments in the test firing. It became obvious: Extremely little had been done to improve fire training in the battalion and eliminate the shortcomings noted at the end of the previous training year. There is a serious rift between obligations and what has been accomplished.

The unsuccessful fire from the combat vehicles was not an exceptional event. On the very same day, we visited a troop firing range where a group of officers was performing a fire exercise with automatic weapons. Again, it was a test. Lt Col V. Shmakov was in charge. Some of the officers passed the test easily. The overall percentage, however, of those passing was not high.

Lt Col Shmakov lamented that the pop-up targets were not functioning properly. The results do not reflect the officers' real training.

Evaluating Col Ye. Grichishnikov ordered that the equipment and mechanisms of the targets be checked out. The poor results were not dependent on poorly functioning targets.

There was no mention of any obligations at the commanders' lesson and the competitive spirit of the personnel was not in evidence. No one heard the word competition during the lesson once.

Such are the facts. Even they are convincing. There is no change for the better, nor any substantial enhancement of effective competition in the unit.

As has already been said, the airborne troops failed to meet their commitments during last year's training cycle. And how was this latest failure received by the party staff and Komsomol organizations? Quite peacefully. The leaders of the unit and subunits held not a single party meeting where the issues of competition could be openly discussed. None of the officer-communists had to account for the reasons of failure with regard to meeting any obligations. During the training year, people in the unit appealed to the subunits to keep abreast of the battery commanded by Capt Yu. Tsvetkov. At the final evaluation, this subunit's results turned out to be only so-so.

Briefly put, the final evaluations provided the airborne troops with many bitter and instructive lessons. Unfortunately, the proper conclusions were not drawn. As before, lesson schedules and training consistency were violated and the development of many training subjects was not materially provided for. It is strange but in the first half of the winter training cycle, not a single firing exercise was conducted in the subunits and only 50 percent of the required exercises using the weapons mounted on combat vehicles. More than half of the scheduled BMD firings failed to take place. The leaders of the artillery subunits could not organize a single exercise in fire direction and control. The airborne troops with whom I spoke remembered with difficulty the last time that they had night training or fired under conditions of darkness.

It became obvious: The poor results of the evaluated firings were logical. It could be no other way.

Many of the unit's shortcomings can be explained, even justified by objective circumstances. Yes, there are difficulties. The evaluation reports are full of them. Particularly, the training base is being expanded and improved. Proper conditions for servicing equipment, especially during the winter, are lacking. Testing at the range began 3 hours later than planned, primarily because the combat vehicles were prepared for field operations in an open area.

Nevertheless, the basic reasons for the chronic inability to accomplish any objectives are not to be found in the above. The problems are in the officers' attitudes towards their entrusted duties. Not too long ago Maj Yu. Em was appointed the commander of one of the airborne battalions. He immediately and enthusiastically set about bringing order to his subunit, ensuring strict discipline in the training process and educating his people. He succeeded in unifying the subunit's officers in a friendly family. The subunit quickly became one of the unit's foremost elements. Much was done to enhance the quality of the lessons and the rejuvenation of competition. Contests are underway for the title of best specialist and best company. The methods of this outstanding commander should be summarized and everyone shown that objective difficulties are significantly reduced when matters are well organized. But neither the staff, nor the party organization lifted a finger with regard to this. During the winter training cycle, not once were the results of competition summarized and the corresponding orders to the unit sent out. Those ahead and lagging behind were just not identified. Let us wait it out, they say, a commission from the district staff will come and put everything in order.

It is hard to explain such a fact: nowhere, either on the staff or on the unit's territory, could one succeed in finding clearly formulated collective commitments, slogans and placards with exhortations for competition. The political officer, Lt Col G. Lyman, explained it as an "annoying omission." But if we look more closely at it, don't we once again see that it has to do with an indifferent attitude towards competition?

Do not the staff and district supervision know that the unit fails to execute training plans, programs and a formally organized competition? They do know

and they are disturbed by it. The chief of staff and the deputy chief of the political directorate, with whom we spoke, are very much aware of the lagging unit's sore points. But the supervision of the next-higher command and control levels and their awareness do not come together as assistance.

For several years in a row now, the evaluators have learned that the field training base of the airborne troops does not correspond to current requirements. The elimination of these shortcomings was planned for by the beginning of the current training year. Training, however, is in full swing but the tank training area, artillery rifle range and vehicle park have not been built, and a number of facilities for airborne training does not meet the requirements. One of the unit commander's deputies angrily said: "It would be better to send a bulldozer of lift-crane next time instead of a group of evaluators. We have been asking for mechanical assistance for more than a year and have had no results. We spend a great deal of time out, but things are not moving along very fast."

Before leaving the unit, I visited the subunits one more time. In Maj Yu. Em's battalion, fire training lessons were to be conducted as scheduled. In the other subunits, however, personnel were either cleaning up or dealing with issues far from the training program.

It occurred to me: Judging by everything, the unit's personnel had grown accustomed to such an organization of the training process; there was no sense of activity to ensure that a training plan or program, i.e., competitive commitments, be totally accomplished, while at the district staff and political directorate, people, it seemed, were prepared for the news that a certain airborne unit would remain among the laggards even after the results of the winter training cycle were in.

12247

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ARMED FORCES

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GROUND FORCES

RADIO-TECHNICAL BATTERY UNDERTAKES CROSS-SPECIALTY TRAINING

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 85 p 1

[Article by Capt A. Dokuchayev, Far East Military District: "A Back-Up Section Is at the Position"]

[Text] As soon as the "enemy" airplanes rushed toward the defended objective and the screens of the scopes were covered with pulsating fireflies, Senior Lieutenant M. Mironov and his subordinates immediately joined in combat work. In the radar vans and at the launch position dynamic loudspeakers reported the rumble of diving airplanes, the explosions of shells, and the crackling of machinegun bursts, but the men performed all operations clearly.

This was a special drill. The fact is that nonregular specialists were at the battle stations at the scopes and missiles. The struggle against the aerial "enemy" was conducted by the back-up personnel of the combat section which was made up of men working in allied specialties today. The battalion chief of staff, Captain A. Kotov, the drill leader, and the commander of the radio-technical battery, Captain S. Ageyev, thoroughly analyzed the actions of the missilemen and their ability to understand the aerial situation and adopt the correct decision, and they evaluated their practical skills. And although the men committed several inaccuracies and errors, the officers remained satisfied with their work.

A high degree of interchangeability in the sections is a tradition of many years in the battalion which was commanded until recently by Lieutenant Colonel M. Moiseyev. The officer organized the training process in such a way that after only several months of service each man could perform not only his own immediate duties, but also the duties of his fellow-serviceman who was next to him. In the last training year, the overwhelming majority of missilemen mastered two or three allied specialties which, in no small degree, contributed to the growth of the subunit's combat readiness and the capture of the title of excellent battalion.

In preparing a worthy greeting for the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, the personnel of the subunit also assumed lofty obligations in this training year. And as always, it was recorded in one of the points of the obligations that each man will master an allied specialty. It is not an easy task if one considers that significant changes occurred in the collective. Lieutenant Colonel Moiseyev had been promoted to a higher

post, several officers had departed for a new place of service, many experienced specialists had been released to the reserve, and young missilemen replaced them.

Under these conditions, the main task facing commanders was the search for those forms of training which would train skillful specialists in a short time. And they were found. Thus, on the suggestion of Senior Lieutenant A. Kryuchkov the missilemen were divided into two training groups in all subunits. The best trained specialists worked in the first group, and in the second--those for whom the training program came with difficulty and the young soldiers. The opportunity to speed up and improve the quality of the missilemen's training appeared.

A substantial role in the rapid placement of the newcomers into formation was played by the study and dissemination of the leading experience of the best commanders. The battery commanded by Captain Ageyev served as the basis for this. This collective has captured the title of excellent for several years in a row and leads in socialist competition. Captain Ageyev rallies the people skillfully and direct them toward the accomplishment of the assigned missions.

After only a two-month stay in the collective, each missileman receives a special assignment card where what he should know about an allied specialty and what standards should be worked out by what time are entered. And the commanders strictly monitor the accomplishment of these tasks.

Competition for the attainment of complete interchangeability in the sections has also received a broad scope in the battalion. There are already many such sections in the subunit. The best are those which are headed by Senior Lieutenant M. Mironov and Lieutenant A. Klimov. The battalion's communists set the tone in the competition. Each of them has mastered several allied specialties and is tirelessly improving his combat skill.

...The drill continues. After accomplishment of the first mission, the second, third, and so forth follow. An intense battle with the aerial "enemy" is under way. A struggle is under way for the attainment of the planned goal in combat training and for a worthy greeting for the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory.

6367

CSO: 1801/173

GROUND FORCES

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON OF DIVERS CLEAR MINES FOR RIVER CROSSING

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 85 p 1

[Article by Capt O. Klenov, Belorussian Military District: "One Hundred Days Beneath the Water"]

[Text] The commander of the reconnaissance-diver platoon, Guards Warrant Officer [praporshchik] V. Markun, carefully marked several "enemy" ground mines with buoys. Now there will be no difficulty in neutralizing them by the explosive method. The diver came to the surface of a wide crack in the ice and pulled himself onto the ice. Here he removed his equipment with the aid of his subordinates and immediately refined the information which they had obtained.

First as always, the engineer reconnaissance patrol which had moved out toward the river discovered the minefield and quickly made passages for the combat equipment. The strong current and icy water did not hinder the divers in the conduct of a detailed reconnaissance of the river's open section: in determining its width, profile of the bottom, nature of the ground, and eliminating obstacles which the "enemy" had emplaced deeply.

Guards Warrant Officer V. Markun reported on the results of the engineer reconnaissance by radio. The ferry-bridge vehicles soon approached. Tanks and BMP's [infantry combat vehicles] appeared right behind them.

After completion of the assault crossing the subordinates of Guards Warrant Officer Markun began to prepare their amphibious transporter for a new march.

The reconnaissance-diver platoon where Guards Warrant Officer V. Markun is the commander has been awarded the medal "For Distinction in Military Service" 2d degree and, in the last training year, again became excellent. The soldiers and sergeants are successfully learning from the commander how skillfully to emplace and neutralize mines, to lay out routes beneath the water for the tankmen, and conduct rescue-evacuation and technical engineering work. Guards Sergeant A. Ryabtsev and Guards Private I. Sholomov no longer think of further life without the profession which they love.

It became a matter of life for Guards Warrant Officer V. Markun long ago. He has plenty of experience and tempering. He spent almost 800 hours beneath the water where many dangers lie in wait for the divers.

It had to happen that on another crossing Guards Warrant Officer V. Markun met his first cousin, master diver Warrant Officer M. Balkovskiy. The latter is also serving in one of the district's engineer units.

Warrant Officer M. Balkovskiy has been awarded the medal "For Combat Services." He also had the occasion to experience deep-water sea descents. Lifting ammunition from a barge sunk in the Barents Sea became one of the first tests for maturity for him.

And on that meeting which became memorable for both Mikhail successfully accomplished several difficult descents. Here, the count of hours which he has spent beneath the water passed 1,600. This means, the cousins calculated, that the two of them have 100 days.

6367

CSO: 1801/173

GROUND FORCES

JOINT TANK-HELICOPTER ANTI-ARMOR EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 85 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt V. Lavrenyuk, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "I Request Fire Support...."]

[Text] At night the reinforced tank battalion commanded on the exercise by Captain V. Yepatko moved up to the forward edge of the battle area [FEBA] and, exploiting gaps in the defense, penetrated to the "enemy's" rear area. However, the forward detachment was unable to reach the target secretly.

Reconnaissance data on the moving up of a powerful "enemy" antitank reserve reached the battalion headquarters. A meeting engagement became imminent. The battalion commander tried to avoid it, bypassing the reserve along a draw. It did not succeed. The combat security was fired upon. Did it mean the river would be reached late?

Captain V. Yepatko established communications with the commander of a flight of helicopter gunships:

"I am fighting 'enemy' tanks in square 45-14. Request fire support. I will mark the FEBA with smoke."

The battalion's tankmen were to coordinate with the helicoptermen for the first time. Even prior to going out to the field Captain Yepatko met with the flight commander. They coordinated the route for moving up, the line of probable encounter with the "enemy," conventional signals.... They selected jump-up areas for the helicopters in the immediate proximity of the FEBA. It would appear that everything had been envisioned. But Captain Yepatko was worried. He now stepped forth in the role of air support controller; mutual understanding between the tankmen and the helicoptermen depended on him to a great extent.

Even during the march of the forward detachment the flight of helicopters displaced to one of the jump-up areas. The crews did not leave the helicopters. The flight commander's radio was constantly on receive....

"No 2, No 3! Start engines. Do as I do!" Captain A. Struk gave the command, having received the instructions of the air support controller.

Pilot-operator Lieutenant A. Vikulin prepared for this flight with a special attitude. Personal friendship and common enthusiasms tie him to Captain Yepatko.

...The "enemy" tanks went into the attack when the helicopters emerged from behind a forest. They fired their rockets and banking, took off.

Captain Yepatko observed the battlefield attentively. An "enemy" self-propelled antiaircraft mount appeared on the right flank. The battalion commander warned the aviators of this. The crew where Lieutenant Vikulin is the pilot-operator changed its combat course and attacked the target from a different direction.

At the same time the tankmen destroyed the antiaircraft mount with accurate fire. Thanks to support from the air, the tankers succeeded in winning the meeting engagement and reaching the river and making an assault crossing of it in time....

After the training battle, the tankmen and helicoptermen gathered together. They analyzed in detail the joint actions which strengthened a feeling of fellowship, confidence in each other, and combat mutual understanding.

6367

CSO: 1801/173

GROUND FORCES

BMP-2; ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLE

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, 1985 (signed to press 21 Feb 85) pp 28-29

[Article by Colonel Yu. Burtsev, candidate of technical sciences: "To the Young Soldier--On Combat Technology"]

[Text] A new perfected BMP-2 has now replaced an infantry combat vehicle cherished by the Soviet motorized forces. In the new model, created on the basis of the BMP-1, the basic combat quality has been improved--the firepower has been increased. This has been achieved by installing as standard equipment more accurate and long-range weaponry, making it possible to fire against both land and air targets.

From a general perspective the BMP-2 is similar to its predecessor. The engine compartment is located in the right front portion of the hull. Here the oil tank with the heater boiler and other elements of the heating system, the ejector box with water and oil radiators, the air filters, the fuel apparatus and other equipment are located.

The six-cylinder diesel engine is protected from the ingress of water when the vehicle is floating. The transmission has undergone virtually no changes. It consists of a master clutch, a variable-speed gear box and two epicyclical shifting mechanisms, all joined together in a common casing, and two separate epicyclical on-board transmissions.

The use of an ideal transmission, a caterpillar drive and a soft suspension assure a road vehicle speed of up to 65 kms per hour.

The control compartment, which is located in the forward part of the vehicle's hull (on the left), is isolated by a strongly heat-sound protected partition. In it there are work positions for a mechanic-driver and gunner. Installed here are observation devices for day and night viewing, instruments for starting the engine, the control-measurement instruments, and also a directional gyro, a road-movement signalling panel, a pneumatic system and a spherical mounting for firing an automatic weapon.

The location on the steering column of the steering wheel, the gear shift levers and the mechanism for engaging the slow transmission as well as broad use of hydraulic methods for drive mechanisms make control of the vehicle easy and convenient.

In the turret and forward part of the hull, separated by a partition from the engine compartment and by a barrier from the assault compartment, there is the combat compartment. It is significantly different from the corresponding compartment of the BMP-1. Located in the expanded turret are the vehicle's standard weaponry and ammunition, the sighting and observation equipment and intake and exhaust ventilation. Located in the turret are the working positions of the commander and the operator-gunner, and on the rotating floor there are magazines for the coaxial machine gun, a belt system for loading the gun with rounds, and an ATGM stowage. In front of the operator there is a day and night sight for firing at land targets from the gun and the coaxial machine gun, two periscope sights, an instrument for rear viewing, rotating and elevating guns mechanisms and control panels (with a gun stabilizer and a system of launching smoke grenades).

On the command cupola there are two sights, an illumination device for night firing and a target-designation device. In front of the commander's seat there are a rear-sight for firing at air and land targets and a control panel with a stabilizer. In the rear there are a radio station and a stand and control equipment for an ATGM launcher. In the turret there are also telephone communications equipment, ceiling lamp and a tap-distributor of the system for cleaning the outside glass of the observation equipment and rear sights, and on the right side of the hull there are supports for three more ATGM launchers.

The 30-mm automatic weapon, intended for use against land and air targets, is installed together with its coaxial machine gun in a rotating mantlet in the firing port of the turret. A two-band system of loading of the gun (with armour-piercing or fragmentation shells, having tracers) makes possible manual or pyrotechnical reloading when firing single rounds and when firing automatically at a low (200-300 rounds/min.) or high (550 rounds/min.) rate of fire.

The range of straight fire of the gun is over 1,000 meters, but the sighting distance of fire against land targets is from 2,000 to 4,000 meters depending on the type of ammunition. Fire against air targets flying at subsonic speeds can be carried out at altitudes of up to 2,000 meters, and the angle of elevation of the equipment reaches 74 degrees.

The gun has guidance controls and is stabilized in the vertical and horizontal planes. The minimum speed of smooth guidance is 0.07-0.1 degrees per second and the maximum is 6 degrees per second. The gun may be shifted to another direction of fire at a speed of 30-35 degrees per second. The load of ammunition of the gun is 500 rounds. The gun's 7.62 mm coaxial PKT machine gun has a rate of fire of 250 rounds per minute. Its sighting distance is up to 2,000 meters.

In the vehicle there is an anti-tank system that has been proven useful in the motorized forces of the Soviet Army. A dismounted variant can also be used, which makes it possible to launch an ATGM's from the ground.

Improvement of the fire power, as in the BMP-1, was achieved by equipping the vehicle with ports and sighting instruments, ensuring that in assault the weaponry can be used in movement and at short stops. Ports with spherical gun mounts make it possible to fire two hand-held machine guns and five automatic rifles.

The assault compartment is somewhat smaller in comparison with the BMP-1. In each of the two sections, separated by a basic fuel tank and battery racks, working places are provided for three motorized riflemen. For landing and assault there are two hatches, and in the rear there are two doors with containers for fuel. Located in the assault compartment are also ammunition for the rifle weaponry, boxes for provisions, a pump for removing water, a pump for the thermal smoke equipment, air ducts for providing purified air, exhaust ventilators for powdery gases and stowages for grenade launchers, antiaircraft guided missiles and other equipment.


The combat personnel of the vehicle consist of a crew (mechanic-driver, operator-gunner and a commander) and riflemen, which make up the motorized-rifle detachment. For the defense of the crew there are AKM automatic weapons, F-1 grenades and a flare gun with cartridges.

The BMP-2 has means of defending the combat personnel from the effects of conventional weapons, nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weaponry and also from fire and from submersion when damaged while floating. It is equipped with thermal smoke equipment and six launchers for firing smoke grenades.

The basic defense of the combat personnel and equipment is provided by the surrounding armour of the vehicle, the hermetically sealed hull and turret and the creation of overpressure of purified air in them. All parts of the hull and turret are able to withstand the effects of shells used by foreign mechanized infantry combat vehicles and armoured personnel carriers.

In a nuclear explosion the flow of gamma radiation causes activation of the vehicle's automatic defense system. In such an event the engine is shut down, the ventilators are stopped, the air intakes are closed off and the absorber-filter air delivery system is turned on, so that the vehicle will be fully sealed up to the approach of the shock wave. After the front of the shock wave has passed the mechanic-driver needs to turn on the supercharger, which delivers purified air at overpressure to the inhabited compartments of the vehicle. The system provides the same kind of defense against poisonous or radioactive substances and in the event of a fire.


The use of the BMP-2, which has good maneuverability, increased firepower and modern methods of defense, substantially increases the combat capabilities of the motorized forces of our army.



[best reproduction available]

Key:

1. Cannon
2. Mechanic/driver's hatch
3. Mechanic/driver's seat
4. Seat
5. Hatch
6. Coaxial machinegun (PKT)
7. Turret
8. Day/night sight
9. Hull
10. Radio antenna
11. ATGM stowage in fighting compartment
12. Machinegun (PKT) magazine
13. Gunner's seat
14. Escape hatch
15. Fuel tank
16. Battery storage
17. Bulkhead
18. Assault element's seat
19. Road wheel
20. Engine compartment
21. Fire-extinguishing system cylinders



[best reproduction available]

Key:

- 3. Mechanic/driver's seat
- 13. Gunner's seat
- 14. Escape hatch
- 22. Track tension adjustment mechanism
- 23. Track idler wheel
- 24. Running wheel
- 25. Firing ports
- 26. Smoke grenade launchers
- 27. Day/night sight head
- 28. Rear door
- 29. Batteries
- 30. Steering wheel

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

APPROXIMATING REALITY IN PVO TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col M. Daniel's: "The Commander and Modern Battle: The Results of Training"]

[Text] That exercise was quite intense: targets continued to appear without end. Although none of them turned up in the impact zone of Maj V. Shvetsov's anti-aircraft missile subunit, their interception and tracking demanded a great deal of effort and concentration. Suddenly, when it seemed that the "all clear" would be given, the radar operators detected a barely visible marker on the screens of their plan position indicators. It would disappear, then reappear again, but it became still brighter with every passing moment. The intensity of non-synchronized interference began to increase unexpectedly. The target could be observed on the screens only as poorly as before, and the subunit commander understood that its tracking would be very difficult; it would require manual tracking skills. He then ordered:

"Sr Lt Nikolenko will act as interception control officer!"

After having spent the entire day at his panel, Sr Lt V. Aliluykin shrugged his shoulders and made way for his comrade.

Sr Lt I. Nikolenko was trained just a little better both theoretically and practically, and everyone knew this. Today, however, he had not sat down at a screen but had only observed how easily, like playing a game, Vladimir Aliluykin had led his targets. Maj Shvetsov was also satisfied, even though he knew that he had an even more reliable specialist in reserve: I. Nikolenko.

The target had hardly entered the impact zone when its marker disappeared from the screen. Sr Lt I. Nikolenko feverishly worked the levers on his panel. Maj Shvetsov, standing behind him, began biting his lips...

The target seemed to vanish into thin air. An angry "all clear" was then received from the command post.

Why had Maj V. Shevtsov's subunit run into this annoying piece of bad luck? The first cause, at least superficially, was the changing of the interception control officers at an unfavorable moment and the uncertain actions of the crew which Nikolenko suddenly took control of. If, however, we look more

closely, this is not a cause, but a result. The result of simplification in the methods of crew training.

I succeeded in visiting some of the exercises being conducted in the subunit and in observing the sequence of actions against speedy, maneuvering targets. At first glance, everything appeared to be in order: the interception control officer was acting forcefully and skillfully, even the operators were keeping up with him; the raid of targets during the exercise was rather dense. Moreover, during the lesson on developing the crews' coordination, the soldiers demonstrated excellent results not only against simulated targets, but also against the real ones depicted by neighboring aviators. By agreement, they exercised in overcoming the air defense borders, while the anti-aircraft gunners trained in tracking real intruders.

Training-simulator equipment was utilized extensively to create a combat model directly next to the impact zone and in it. Both the real and simulated targets changed course, altitude and speed constantly; jamming was also employed. Briefly put, a rather complicated situation was created, a situation which required intense efforts. It is understandable that the operators became confused during the first exercises, but they gradually became accustomed to those things which are at the root of the bad luck which caught up with the subunit during its recent exercise.

The complicated combat models, because of their exercise monotony, became simple and worn out. The "enemy" was transformed from a clever-thinking innovator into such a robot which acted according to a set of routine actions. This had been pointed out to the subunit commander, but as the training became more complicated, changes to vary the activities of the air "enemy" were not made in the subunit. Both Sr Lt V. Aliluykin and Sr Lt I. Nikolenko became used to even the complicated but identically planned "enemy" raids. This, of course, resulted in routine actions at the panels and caused people to forget about the tension and proper thinking habits of real battle.

Therefore, during the exercise, when only slow-maneuvering targets appeared on the screen, work was conducted at the usual tempo. But then suddenly the "enemy" employed an unexpected maneuver which was not one of the usually played-out scenarios and an annoying breakdown occurred.

All commanders know that it is necessary to create complicated and diverse scenarios. Of course, an "enemy" who moved ahead on a straight line is, as they say, a thing of the past. Today, hardly a commander would provide wittingly a weak "enemy" to his subordinates in lessons and exercises. On the contrary, each one tries to complicate the scenario and bring it as near as possible to the conditions of real battle, and every commander has his own way of doing this.

In this context, a second kind of exercise comes to mind. In an analogous situation, Maj V. Aksutin's subordinates "destroyed" a target. However, it was not that long ago that the bad luck, which had struck Maj Shevtsov's subunit, struck this collective as well. Maj Aksutin had to deal with many considerations regarding this event. He had been exacting and principled in

his evaluations. Not a single small detail had been overlooked by him; this would preclude him from having his exercise influenced in any way. Especially this time, his actions were irreproachably coordinated, skillful and full of initiative.

These sources are in the tense daily lessons. In all exercises, Maj Aksutin always creates a difficult, dynamic and quickly changing scenario. He regards every exercise not only as the interception and tracking of a target, but also as a series of actions, stipulated by the confrontation of 2 sides where each side intends to accomplish its assigned mission by any means possible. This contributes elements of psychological pressure in the exercise and forces the missile men to think creatively and work with all their abilities. Hence, his good results.

There is no need to prove that the coefficient of useful activity in exercises depends on such factors as the tactical background and actions of the "enemy." If the opposing side shows cunning and shrewdness because this is programmed by the exercise organizer, the trainees must respond with the corresponding actions and their leader with high tactical preparedness and methodological expertise. Otherwise, indulgences and oversimplifications are unavoidable.

I succeeded in getting a chance to follow an exercise in a subunit commanded by Maj B. Kotov. Everything went by the numbers; there were no mistakes or inadequacies. But something in this effort caught my eye: everything was going so painfully easily that there was none of the tension characteristic for such exercises. I told the lessons instructor about this. Maj Kotov shrugged his shoulders: "There are many targets, they are dense, one hypothetical situation leads to another..."

It was all too obvious: The "enemy" had been denied any initiative. He is paralyzed in maneuver, appears on the same side of the screen and at the same altitudes without fail, he does not jam. Briefly put, take him on with your bare hands. I had to get involved. All it took was the introduction of non-synchronized interference, a "drop" of the targets to lower altitudes, the "taking out" of certain pieces of equipment, and we were off. Maj Kotov drew some conclusions from this exercise. But why wasn't this done before? The regimental staff officers surely must have noticed the shortcomings of the training process.

Another commander even wanted to create a difficult and varying scenario for the exercises, but it did not work out: there was no experience or know-how. The skill in creating an instructive scenario lies, in my opinion, at the same level of expertise as in organizing for battle. Such expertise does not come by itself. It has to be taught and learned.

I always visit with pleasure the exercises conducted in the subunits commanded by officers N. Kurskiy and N. Startsev. They skillfully and carefully prepare every exercise, creating complicated and non-standard scenarios. These officers employ extensively state-of-the-art technical training aids and training simulator equipment. The knowledgeable employment of these aids

allows the creation of a tactical backdrop corresponding to current views on the conduct of combat with the enemy in the air.

The creation of such a situation, of course, is no simple matter. A whole circle of specialists and efficiency experts is pulled together in this endeavor. Thanks to this, however, during the exercises, the crews always operate under conditions of active electronic countermeasures employed by the "enemy;" the tempo of the work increases from exercise to exercise and the time limits for the accomplishment of combat training missions is reduced. Constant attention is paid to the solution of lead-in problems if little information is provided. Without fail, temporary indicators are evaluated at every stage of the practical operation. Every such exercise enriches the knowledge and experience of both the subordinates and the commanders.

There is still one more important point: There is a rule in these subunits: every officer, who teaches his subordinates, must himself be confident enough to meet the normative requirements of combat and, if necessary, be able to replace any member of a gun crew...

It is a truism that we must prepare for a struggle with a strong, technically equipped opponent. In order to emerge victorious in such a confrontation, we need to conduct every lesson according to a scenario approximating as closely as possible the conditions of actual combat.

12247

CSO: 1801/178

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AIRCRAFT REPAIR TOO DEPENDENT ON SEPARATE REPAIR FACILITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Taranin, deputy chief engineer, Air Forces, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Problems of 'Minor' Repair"]

[Text] One of the rotary wing aircraft found itself in a difficult situation during the accomplishment of a flight assignment and received damage. After the landing specialists of the Air Force Engineer Service under the direction of officer V. Markevich inspected the helicopter thoroughly. Having evaluated the damage which had been discovered, they came to a conclusion: the aircraft could be restored by personnel of the regiment's technical maintenance unit (TECh). The work was conducted in two shifts. It was organized by Major A. Popov.

The repair of the combat craft was concluded in compressed time. After inspection by a specially created commission it was permitted to make a test flight. The helicopter was in combat formation again....

Of course, cases of breakdown are rare. And it is even more important to train the specialists for the conduct of equipment repair directly in the unit so that combat readiness is not reduced even for one day. True, they may object to me: there are special enterprises which are intended precisely to restore aviation equipment in a qualified manner and with high quality.

Everything is correct. Enterprises, and contemporary equipment, and specialists exist who are ready to accomplish the most difficult and important operations for putting flight vehicles into formation. But what will happen if, in an actual combat situation, the requirement arises to eliminate certain damage in compressed times?

The experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that the majority of the airplanes which received damage in air battles were restored directly on the airfield by the forces of the same specialists who prepared the equipment for take-offs. The aviators applied maximum efforts, skill, and selflessness so that the winged machine could climb into the sky as quickly as possible. At times the specialists had to go without sleep for days and literally create miracles so that an airplane covered with wounds which, it would seem, had been hopelessly put out of action would be in condition to take off into the sky at the designated time and conduct air battle reliably.

I believe that the combat practice of the frontline-fighter aviators is a convincing example of the fact that the specialists should be able to accomplish confidently and competently in any situation the operations necessary for the restoration of damaged aviation equipment. The importance of this task increases especially under contemporary conditions when combat operations will have a more fluid, dynamic nature than formerly. It is not excluded that aviation specialists may encounter a situation where they simply will not have the possibility to receive additional assistance with materials, technical means, and check equipment. In such a case the only hope is their own strength and capabilities.

But, unfortunately, individual specialists can in no way dismiss the thought that all concerns about maintaining the equipment in high combat readiness can be placed on the repair organizations alone. Such people lull themselves with the thought that contemporary aviation equipment possesses high operating qualities--reliability and dependability. They say, is it worth expending strength, resources, and time on preparing for independent repair if breakdowns occur extremely rarely? Well, even if something happens they can call the plant representatives to the unit and place on them all the trouble in the restoration of damaged units and assemblies. And what is even easier--send them directly to the plant. Let them look into it there!

With such an attitude it is not difficult to calculate the material damage which is inflicted on the matter. The detached duty of plant representatives at the unit and the sending of equipment to the manufacturing plant or aviation repair enterprise cost the state dearly. But it is much worse that in this case a certain moral loss is inflicted: the hope that all problems will be solved by some outsider dampens the ardor of the specialists who are responsible for the good working order of the combat equipment, engenders a parasitical attitude in them, and reduces interest in supplementing their knowledge and improving repair skill. It is precisely among such people that the opinion exists that it is impossible to conduct the effective and quality repair of aviation equipment under troop conditions.

However, the course of combat training shows something else. The specialists of the Air Force Engineer Service of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany have accumulated certain experience in this question. It also permits stating confidently that such tasks can be accomplished directly among the troops. What is needed for this? As practice has shown, the basic problems arise in the training of the specialists.

This task is accomplished in the following manner in the units of the Group's Air Force. The best trained people who become instructors of troop repair are selected from among the men of the Air Force Engineer Service. Periodically, at the beginning of the winter and summer periods of training they are sent on detached service to the aviation repair enterprises where they improve their skills in the accomplishment of restoration work on combat equipment. These aviators also subsequently comprise the basis of the repair groups which are created in the technical maintenance unit of the regiment and in the squadrons.

Troop repair classrooms which we now have almost everywhere in the Group of Forces are called upon to render great assistance in training such specialists.

They are equipped with special work sites which provide the opportunity to accumulate experience in the restoration of various systems, assemblies, and units of airplanes and helicopters. These classrooms are equipped with the necessary tools, materials, and parts, which permits conducting high-quality training of specialists in troop repair and making genuine masters of them. The training classrooms are distinguished by the efficient arrangement of necessary accessories, well-selected materials, and blanks.

But, unfortunately, in some places the creation of such classrooms has been relegated to the category of matters which are not considered primary. Lieutenant Colonel A. Kovchik and several other officers stand precisely on this point of view. Here, as a rule, they like to refer to certain "objective" reasons--the absence of instructions, a shortage of materials, and the insufficient qualifications of subordinate specialists.

Of course, it is easiest of all to sit and wait. But you see, the training of repair groups is not a question of the distant future but the urgent call of the present.

At times you look at some aviation specialist and you marvel--competent, erudite, orients freely in various theoretical directions and, when the necessity arises to delve into some particularly practical question--obvious helplessness. And here, let us say, Major I. Voloshin did not begin to look for "objective reasons" but began to roll up his sleeves and began to work, as they say and, together with other aviators of the subunit, created all conditions so that the organization of repair work in the unit met the highest requirements. There are not enough tools and accessories? They made them with their own hands and mobilized the creative energy of the innovators and people having curious thought. There are not enough expendable supplies? They used assemblies and units which are subject to write-off for certain reasons.

In the air units of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany they are not limited to the creation of classrooms alone. There are special simulators which permit the personnel to obtain skills in the elimination of combat damage to the load-bearing elements of the airframe, the skin, and fuel, hydraulic, and other systems of the aircraft. Such simulators have been installed in the subunits where officers A. Razmaritsin and V. Zhigachev serve.

It should be noted that the mobile check-repair equipment being produced by industry permits accomplishing virtually the entire volume of minor and medium repair. However, the experience of its employment shows that some of it has shortcomings which reduce the efficiency of restoration work. The main thing which causes the concern of the specialists is the cumbersomeness of the equipment.

By the efforts of the innovators, in many air units models of compact sets have been made which include the most necessary tools and accessories for repair and restoration subunits. These sets are easily transported to any needed point and can be prepared for work quickly. The high evaluation of the specialists was received, for example, by the so-called repair kit for radio equipment which was created by the skilled craftsmen headed by Lieutenant Colonel G. Volgin. It includes a reserve of expendable material and parts necessary for the effective restoration of radio equipment's fitness for work.

I should like to speak especially of the employment of argon-arc welding without which the repair of damage to airplanes and helicopters is impossible. Innovators led by Captain A. Leonov created the design of a portable welding apparatus which can be placed in small suitcases. It is noteworthy that standard airfield units are used as the source of electric power.

The accomplishment of one more important task awaits its turn: the restoration of aviation engines under troop conditions. Of course, this matter is far from simple and requires contemporary methods of technical diagnostics. But the experience of such work conducted by Lieutenant Colonel V. Zhigachev and others of our specialists shows that this task is also within the capability of the troop repairmen. Its accomplishment opens new prospects for restoration work among the troops which permits increasing significantly the efficiency of use of aviation engines, reducing the cost of their operation, and raising the combat capability of the subunits.

We have now generalized in detail the leading experience of repair-restoration work in the air subunits of the Group of Forces. Its introduction everywhere will help in the further improvement in the operation of aviation equipment and its efficient use when accomplishing training combat missions.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

SIMULATED FLAMEOUT DURING HIGH-ALTITUDE INTERCEPT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jan 85 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col A. Andryushkov: "Special Incident: Efficiency and Quality Are Most Important"]

[Text] Captain V. Mikheyev, military pilot 1st class and new flight commander, adjusted his parachute harness, tightened the throat mike on his neck, pushed the push-to-talk button and, barely moving his lips, spoke: "one...one...one." The radio set had already been warmed up and the sound in the helmet headset was loud and clear with no static.

"23--start!"

The squadron commander, Lt Col N. Mikhaylov, sitting at the control panel microphone in hand caught the restrained impatience in the pilot's voice. Mikhaylov liked this officer and his desire to accomplish each mission in the air "with no hitches."

Mikhaylov looked at his watch. One minute till start. That, surely, would seem like an eternity to the pilot, thought the squadron commander, but that's all right, let him be patient and calm himself and he will be more sure while accomplishing his mission. The squadron commander had prepared several surprises for his subordinate.

Behind him he heard a noise and Mikhaylov looked around. Three officers, Mikheyev's peers who had also recently been assigned as flight commanders, craned their heads toward the circular scan indicator.

"Yes?"

"Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, request permission to observe for the purpose of exchanging experience."

"Permission granted," said Mikhaylov, "but with one condition: You, and not I, will conduct the pilot's critique."

Having received the "OK" to start the engine, Capt Mikheyev proceeded in complete accordance with instructions and the task developed. When he saw

the runway through his windshield, he smoothly brought the engine to its maximum revolutions and turned on the afterburner.

"You are clear to take off!" Mikhaylov commanded.

The altimeter indicator hand went around and around ticking off the meters. Soon, according to the instrument, he was at the edge of the stratosphere. In accordance with the plan the afterburner was kicked on again; he broke the sound barrier and dashed to the aircraft's service ceiling.

"32," Lt Col Mikhaylov provided new information on the "enemy": "There is a target above you!"

The onboard radar sweep showed a target blip at the upper edge of the indicator to the right of center. Mikheyev had not expected to meet the "enemy" exactly in the area and therefore somewhat abruptly began to turn onto the intercept course. The pilot felt the control stick vibrate.

Glancing at the angle of attack indicator, Mikheyev noted that the pointer was in the danger zone. He reacted instantly: leveling out and reducing his climb angle. The vibrations stopped, but the target blip disappeared from the screen. The intercept was broken off!

The officer glanced at the target screen again. It showed that the blip from the target above had dropped back a little. And so, if... And here is where the pilot, filled with emotion, made a mistake--he again began to make an aiming "climb" at a large angle of attack. In the blink of an eye the altimeter showed another thousand meters and then the instrument froze at one of the lines. The laws of aerodynamics came into force.

Mikheyev felt the control stick barely reacting to him. And then he noted that both air speed indicator pointers were practically at zero. He had lost speed! An alarmed silence filled the cabin. The tachometer, the turbine engine revolutions indicator, showed autorotation numbers; that is, the engine was rotating by itself. The warning panel burned brightly.

"Flameout!" Mikheyev reported.

"Follow instructions! Make decisions based on the situation!" The squadron commander's voice was firm, but, as always, calming and reassuring.

The first thing Mikheyev wanted to do was to automatically restart the engine, and there is a reliable system for this. But having gotten in a dangerous situation due to his own fault did not shake the pilot; on the contrary, it seem to focus his mind, and it seemed as if Mikheyev could see the points of instruction in front of him: "in the air the engine can best be started from an altitude of..."

He set the rate of descent. To maintain the storage batteries, Mikheyev turned off the high current consumers. He only left on those things which were most important: altitude and heading reference, artificial

horizon, and radio. Mentally the officer already expected to successfully overcome the "special" incident which had arisen onboard.

The squadron commander, while monitoring the captain did not interfere. Mikheyev in the meantime pulled the engine throttle out of the "stop" position and then heard the characteristic noise in his headsets of the turbine spooling up. The ignition system responded correctly to the pilot's skillful actions. The instruments came alive. One after another the red lights went out.

The runway rushed up, and the characteristic bounce one always feels during landing told the pilot that the flight was over.

...Mikheyev put the engine throttle in the "stop" position, removed his mask, put his hot hands on his face and the palms became wet with drops of sweat. In front of the cockpit windshield, the light blue screen of the training set glowed softly. The preliminary preparation of the air warriors for subsequent flights continued in accordance with the training plan.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

DEALING WITH REPETITIVE PILOT ERROR

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Basok, Red Banner Military District of Odessa:
"Repetitive Error")

[Text] Having accomplished the mission, the pilots rushed to the flight evaluation center after their return; each was interested in the results of his operational efficiency. The aviators focused particular attention on the quality of their piloting techniques.

Majors V. Barsukov and I. Shapyrin, Cpt V. Pitomets and others performed all flight components impeccably, from take off to landing. Briefly put, the majority of the regiment's pilots performed flawlessly in the air. Not everyone, however.

For example, having finished his flight, Sr Lt V. Logvinov performed his landing operations. He landed his plane at a sharp landing angle. The error was serious. Logvinov repeated it, as entries in the journal indicate, for the sixth consecutive time. This leads one to think that no one had seriously worked on eliminating such a flaw from Logvinov's piloting technique. Former squadron commander Lt Col A. Grishin himself wrote in the journal for the sixth time: "Incorrect distribution of attention."

The same entry was made on military pilot 1st Class Cpt N. Kabanov who repeated the very same error for the fourth consecutive time when he landed his plane. The question involuntarily arises: Once the cause has been determined, why were not measures taken to eliminate the problem?

Above all, it must be mentioned that the term "incorrect distribution of attention" does not totally reveal the cause of the errors committed by the pilots as they land. After all, every aerial warrior's piloting technique is individual and has its own specific characteristics peculiar only to that pilot, and the errors committed by them as they pilot their aircraft have various causes. One aviator, for example, poorly knows the requirements of his official instructions, a second one demonstrates a lack of discipline or carelessness in the air, and a third one is insufficiently prepared.

If this is so, then a different approach is needed to correct the errors committed. Let us assume that one officer needs to work out a tasks on the

trainer or in a cockpit one more time, a second officer needs to study a particular chapter of aerodynamics, and a third must show during a test flight how to perform knowledgeably this or that flight component. In all instances, however, work should be done in such a manner that the same errors are not repeated. If this is not the case, it means that the squadron and flight commanders are not doing their job in the important area of ensuring flight safety. It is also obvious that Cpt Kabanov's and Sr Lt Logvinov's commanders did not do everything they were supposed to, otherwise, the 2 pilots would not have committed the same error over and over again.

Besides, one does not need to look far for an example of how it is necessary to work with aviators who commit errors in piloting. A valuable experience is right nearby, in a neighboring squadron.

...The fighter-bomber piloted by Cpt S. Styrov gently and precisely touched down on the concrete slabs of the landing strip. On previous flights, he could not have boasted about this: he had committed an error while landing. For the squadron commander, Lt Col V. Rabinin, this was a signal for direct action. He immediately assembled pilots and reminded them of the rules for landing under the given meteorological conditions. Afterwards, at a flight critique, he analyzed in detail Cpt Styrov's errors by utilizing data from evaluation center. Additionally, the squadron commander explained the essence of the physical phenomena occurring during landing from the point of aerodynamics. On the day of preliminary preparations, Rabinin conducted a class with the pilots on computation methodology during landing with winds varying in strength and direction. Then, flight commanders continued the work. They conducted training exercises with the pilots in actual cockpits and developed the pilots' concentration. Rabinin personally supervised the officers' preparations. He paid particular attention to Cpt Styrov. Now, Rabinin himself broke down his actions into minute detail and talked about ways of correcting errors in piloting during the altitude alignment of the aircraft. Styrov's comrades were drawn into the conversation. There was an exchange of opinions. If one pilot made a mistake, all the others profited from it.

Rabinin tested the effectiveness of his measures during today's flights with the aid of the evaluation center. The tape showed well the slightest flaws in piloting techniques and in the performance of all flight components.

The squadron commanders focused attention on such deviations which cannot be called errors, because altitude, speed and roll angle changes were not made outside of permitted parameters. He did this so that small things would not become errors. At the next flight critique, Rabinin did not keep quiet about these small things. He mentioned that one of the pilots demonstrated a shortcoming because of inattentiveness, another because of indecisiveness and a lack of initiative; a third pilot overestimated his own capabilities.

The pilots listened attentively to their commander. They analyzed not only their errors, but also those committed by their squadron comrades. Together, they searched for ways to correct them and did everything they could so as not to repeat them in the future.

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1 May 1985

NAVAL FORCES

BRIEFS

USE OF NAVIGATION TRAINER--It is well known that specialists of the navigator's department must periodically adjust the log on a measured course. This operation is not simple and requires firm skills, great accuracy.... "Ready!" The ship passes the leading beacons. "Zero." The stopwatch clicks in the hands of the navigator, reading off the time for passage of the measured course. And here are the next two leading beacons. Now the navigator and the commander of the electrical navigation group turn to the readings of the log and stopwatch and to special tables. The operation is repeated after a while. Then the officers determined the log correction factor from the data obtained. ...All this actually occurs although the ship expends neither fuel nor engine service life. Such drills can be conducted by means of a special simulator created by the chief of the navigator's office, Warrant Officer [michman] Zh. Grigoryan. The simulator provides the opportunity for the officers to work out skills on any equipment installed on the ships. This is by no means the first innovation introduced by communist Grigoryan. He has five valuable innovational suggestions to his credit. Warrant Officer Grigoryan's area of responsibility is vast--four classrooms. The contingent of trainees is the broadest: from active duty specialists--helmsmen and navigator electricians--to senior assistants and commanders of ships. Here this office has been declared the best in the fleet for several years in a row in accordance with the results of the inspection competition. [By Capt Lt V. Pasyakin] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 85 p 1] 6367

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SPECIAL TROOPS

CONSTRUCTION: COMRADE'S COURT, DISCIPLINE IN SUBUNITS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 85 p 2

[Article by Maj B. Zotov, for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Red Banner Caucasus Military District: "Facing Trial before One's Comrades--Discipline of the Military Construction Worker"]

[Text] Sr Lt M. Paramonov went to the commander of the military construction detachment, Lt Col P. Mazur, for advice. They talked about Pvt N. Kasimov who was just beginning his army service. Despite all the measures of disciplinary influence, the young soldier was reaching the point beyond which he would have to answer to the total severity of Soviet law.

The detachment commander summarized the conversation: "On the basis of a decision made at a meeting of the company's personnel, I referred Pvt Kasimov's case to the comrade's court of military construction workers. And we need to do this right away."

The company's men reacted differently to the news of the impending convening of the comrade's court of the detachment's military construction workers. The company stood in good repute, and some people were perplexed: why, allegedly, did Paramonov have to attract everybody's attention to perhaps the only violator of discipline?

"And why air your dirty laundry in public?", asked the commander of a nearby subunit, Sr Lt V. Zuperman, of Paramonov.

Paramonov retorted: "I have no reason to hide it from anyone. Besides, things can only get better in the company because of this."

Company commander Sr Lt M. Paramonov works, as everyone thinks, on discipline. Order based on the manual and comfort in the barracks, unrelenting control and exactitude. Not a single violation of military and labor discipline here goes by without the attention of the commanders and the party and Komsomol organizations. It is no accident that the company successfully meets all production tasks. However, Kasimov's situation could not help but cause alarm. The company commander felt all the more clearly that the soldier's conduct affected the collective's mood extremely negatively.

People say that there are mistakes which are impossible to correct. The comrade's court of military construction workers, an elective public organ,

was especially set up to warn against similar hasty moves. The best of the construction workers make up the court: Jr Sgt S. Kozhemyakin, pvts Sh. Khasanov and V. Samchuk.

The court's chairman, Jr Sgt S. Kozhemyakin, summoned the witnesses who would testify in the Kasimov case after he had reviewed the evidence presented by the detachment commander.

The day before the trial, I met with Justice Captain A. Polyakov.

He stated: "The comrade's court of military construction workers plays an important role in the prevention of legal violations and the education of the unit's personnel through persuasion and social influence and the establishment in the collective of an atmosphere of intolerance towards any anti-social manifestations. In military construction detachments, they review the acts and legal violations of military construction workers, or privates (PFCs). For example, they deal with cases of being absent from the unit without leave, cases of rudeness, shirking work, violating equipment safety regulations, cases of poor construction quality, etc. We, the officials of the military procurator's officers, render them legal and methodological assistance."

Of course, there are other ways to influence violators in the military collective. Nevertheless, the comrade's court is still a particularly special event. Even the word "court" sounds a severe warning. Even the court's legal procedures, which basically repeat those which one finds in a people's court, have a sobering affect on the offenders and forces them to realize that it is only a single step to another, more severe court.

At the same time, however, it is a court of your comrades. It is made up by people for whom you yourself voted, electing them in open voting for a 1-year term: chairman and court secretary, his deputies and court members. These are all people who serve with you; you work with them in the same brigade, sleep in the same barracks, and eat at the same table. For this reason, to hear words of condemnation from their mouths is most painful indeed.

"Rise, court is in session!" These were the words which began the comrade's court in the case of military construction worker, Pvt N. Kasimov. Jr Sgt S. Kozhemyakin, who chaired the proceedings, conducted the session confidently and knowledgeably.

Pvt N. Kasimov, who was sitting in a place specifically designated for him, had hung his head low, trying not to look at his comrades. They, in turn, went up to the rostrum one after another and spoke of their relation to the case. They did not skimp on the bitter truth, or hold back sharp words. But one also heard things like: "Kasimov can work and serve as well as anyone; after all, there is but a single entry on his record."

Afterwards, Kasimov told me: "They remembered, although I thought that no one would want to see anything good in me. It is true that there can be another

court after the comrade's court..." This meant that he understood that people were not indifferent to his fate.

I am sure that the lesson which his comrades taught Kasimov will stay with him for a long time. Even for potential violators of military and labor discipline, Kasimov's lesson will serve as a grave warning.

Time passes. After his comrades' censure which was pronounced in a court decision, Kasimov began to change for the better. Everyone noticed this. Communists M. Paramonov, P. Khetauri and Kh. Zaseyev, and the Komsomol activists did everything they could to fortify the soldier's belief in his own strengths.

Sr Lt Parmonov's company, judging by the past year's results, took first place in the detachment. This success is tied to the strong military and labor discipline in the collective. In everyone's opinion, however, it was not the comrade's court of military construction workers which played the final role in this.

On the other hand, comrade's courts of military construction workers do not perform everywhere the functions assigned to them by the existing situation. As experience shows, the main cause of this is the insufficient attention on the part of commanders to the activities of the comrade's court and an underestimation of their role in the education of the collective.

Of course, there is hardly anything pleasant in revealing for all to see the shortcomings and omissions in one's work. But the comrade's court is empowered not only to apply measures of public influence on violators; it can announce that the comrades were putting the violator on notice. It can also publicly reprimand and sentence the violator, petition for the removal of the violator's honorary titles, reduce him in rank or position, etc. Additionally, the court can inform the commander of uncovered causes and circumstances which facilitated the commission of the act or legal violation.

It was especially this, it seems, which more than anything disturbed Sr Lt V. Zuperman. His company was never one of the best. His commander, Lt Col Mazur, advised him more than once to conduct a similar meeting; this would provide the basis for bringing the worst offenders of discipline before the comrade's court. Sr Lt Zuperman, however, tried in every possible way to convince the detachment commander that there allegedly was no serious reason to do such a thing in the company.

But there was a reason, and a serious one at that. Let us look only at the attitudes towards their service on the part of privates M. Provotorov, P. Tikhonov, and S. Fitsner. Incidentally, they were finally brought before the comrade's court in the end, but it was the detachment commander who provided the initiative for this move. Neglect of the education of the public and the collective does not pass unnoticed. This was confirmed a second time during the session of the comrade's court. It was revealed that Sr Lt Zuperman had been hiding discipline violations from the commander. It was also made known

that the company's Komsomol organization was working poorly and that its educational work had been neglected.. The party organization was forced to have the company commander severely answer for his actions.

We can assume that the young officer will draw the right conclusions after his punishment.

Recently, Sr Lt Paramonov received a letter from his former subordinate:
"The lesson I received from the comrade's court was not in vain; I still carry it in my soul."

This comrade's court is a most severe court: it would seem that the court was a court of personal conscience.

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SPECIAL TROOPS

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MILITARY HISTORY

LT GEN KOVALEV ON TRANSPORT IN EARLY YEARS OF WWII

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jan 85 p 6

[Interview with Lt Gen Kovalev by G. Yastrebtsov: "Military Roads: All for the Front--All for Victory"; date and place not given/

[Text] Moscow during the war. A dreary winter day. As if it were just today, I see the old log houses on 1905 Street. People are stoking their stoves, and columns of white smoke rise into the frozen sky.

The snow crunches under our felt boots. I and my grandfather are walking towards the Vagankovskiy Bridge. Grandfather works for the railroad and sometimes takes me along. At first, a slight shiver is felt in the rails; afterwards, growing with every instant, the heavy rumble of a train rolls by. Angrily, the steam engine hoots; one hears the staccato knocking of the wheels and the metallic clang of the couplers. Cars with tanks, covered with tarpaulins, roll by the platform; these are followed by heated goods vans with half-open doors, out of which cavalry horses look. One sees guards in long sheepskin coats with rifles on the brake-platforms. All of this roars out, flies past headlong and disappears in a snowy whirl...

I walk with my grandfather along the paths. Suddenly, cold locomotives tower up like murky heaps: three at once, frozen to each other. One of them has a hole torn in its black smooth side the size of my head.

"Grandfather, what is that?"

"A shell burned into the tender."

"Steam engines do not war, do they?"

"What do you think? We patch them up a bit and it's back to the front."

To this day, I remember my child-like immense amazement of that time: "Steam engines war!" Even now, after more than 40 years, you are struck not only by the deeds of soldiers on the battlefield, but also by the heroic work, similar to the

soldiers', of those who withstood the pains and burdens of the war in the same manner as our soldiers. The truck driver, the steam engine engineer, the civil pilot, the captain of a merchant ship, the skipper of a river barge— of all those who traveled the severe roads of the war, who shipped supplies and ammunition, weapons and letter from home to those on the front, and who transported the wounded to the rear, I wish I could remember them all by name.

Today we are conversing with Lt Gen Tech Trps and Dr of Military Sciences, I.V. Kovalev. During the Great Patriotic War, he was chief of the Central Department of Military Transportation for the General Staff, a member of the Transportation Committee of the State Defense Committee [GKO] and a people's commissar.

[Question] Ivan Vladimirovich, when the war began, transportation workers had to switch over from peacetime work to wartime. How was this done?

[Answer] We prepared for defense in good time. Already by 1939, we had achieved a considerable superiority over the probable enemy in railroad capacity in the areas near the old borders. After the liberation of the Western Ukraine and Byelorussia, however, the border moved westward. For hundreds of kilometers at a time, the rail lines there were in a state of disrepair, and the track gauge was narrow, Western European, to boot. The same was true for the Baltic region.

Understanding that this could seriously complicate supplying the troops with everything necessary, the General Staff insisted on reconstruction. K. G. Zhukov particularly thought it absolutely necessary to start at once; expressing himself in the language of railroad workers, he told us we should start immediately on changing the track gauge. However, major investments of capital in billions of rubles were necessary for this.

As for Hitler's Germany, the rail lines of that country, as well as those of occupied Czechoslovakia and Poland, were put on a schedule which allowed the maximum amount of movement already from 25 May 1941. Transportation capacities permitted the enemy to increase his forces in the main sectors quickly. We needed no less than 25 days to concentrate the first strategic echelon of our armed forces.

In the summer and fall of 1941, 291 divisions, 94 brigades and more than 2 million replacements were moved along the rail lines westward to the points where our forces were concentrating. On the other hand, a counter flow rushed from the west: we had to transport from the frontal zones 2,500 enterprises and roughly 18 million people.

We refitted on the move. Railroad workers had had a rule for years: turn in the majority of the cars at the end of the workday, i.e., by 1800 hours. At major stations and rail junctions, trains were then assembled. The Germans knew this and bombed us. In other words, we had to change our inappropriate practices.

During the first days of the war, 5 combined-arms armies and hundreds of trains loaded with weapons moved westward from the interior military districts. In order for all of them to reach their destinations on time, it was also necessary to take extreme measures. A speed schedule was introduced on the rail lines. Trains with weapons and ammunition were assigned military transport numbers. An all-union inventory of cars was organized, the information system was redone and people began to code every train.

On 29 June 1941, we received a directive from the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks): everything possible was to be moved to the rear, the rest was to be destroyed. After several months, on 14 February 1942, the decision was made at a joint session of the GKO and the party's politburo to set up a Transportation Committee with the GKO. Besides us, the specialists, 4 politburo members headed by I. V. Stalin became committee members. Having concentrated in its hands all the resources of the transportation system, the committee took up the organization of their precise coordination.

[Question] Tell us how that was actually done.

[Answer] Confirming the decision, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief focused our attention on the fact that we were not establishing just another superfluous command echelon, but that we were taking hold of a weak one which had to be strengthened, because victory or defeat on the fronts depended on it. That was how it actually was. I will mention that a considerable part of our weapons supplies, which had been concentrated in our western regions, had been seized by the enemy. Many ammunition plants were being relocated to the south, in central and western cities. By October 1941, we had lost more than 300 plants which could have produced 8 million shells, approximately 3 million mines, and 2 million bombs monthly. We had to fill in these losses and quickly complete the relocation of the country's productive forces to the east in an organized manner.

Thousands of civilian trains were streaming in one direction, while thousands of military trains were moving in the other. These civilian trains were also assigned numbers, and they too moved according to a strict schedule. Mobile direction centers were developed to go along with military maintenance detachments which had at their disposal a material supply base, including columns of steam locomotives and repair trains.

This operation was unprecedented in its scope. Here are just a few figures. We evacuated 667 plants to the Urals and set them up, 322 plants to Western and Eastern Siberia, 308 to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and 226 to the region around the Volga. Within 4 to 6 months, the majority of the enterprises moved renewed production. Their production for combat of tanks, planes, artillery, and other military equipment made it to the front by the start of our largest strategic operations.

The management of sea and river traffic was also restructured in accordance with wartime requirements. Civil ships were quickly refitted for military use. Authorities from the GKO and the people's commissariats directed steam-navigation.

The Transportation Committee did all it could to ensure that the transportation of all military formations was done with the greatest secrecy. This largely determined whether surprise was achieved at the front, i.e., the success of the military operation. Transportation became an important element in preparing and supporting more than 50 major Red Army offensives. Nazi intelligence was unable to discover the time and direction of our attacks on time or the composition of the forces drawn up for the operation for none of our strategic operations.

In order to ensure transportation secrecy, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief gave orders to allow only a strictly limited number of people in on the planning; reports were to go only to the General Staff. All telephone conversations on the subject were prohibited. Pre-arranged figures were introduced to designate transportation trains. In preparing for an offensive, Supreme Headquarters always took measures to confuse the enemy with regard to their real intentions. The forward movement of troops and equipment to the sectors of the main attack was conducted secretly and in compliance with the strictest rules of camouflage. To do this, of course, was not easy; after all, for example, it took more than 440,000 cars to transport troops and supplies in preparation for the Bagration operation. This was 65 percent of the whole country's rolling-stock at the time.

New forms of movement control were successfully employed: one-way passage for trains with minimal interval. Three to 4 military trains would move together, one after another, at a speed unheard of for that time to cover up to as much as 900 kilometers a day. Having arrived at their destination, the trains were quickly unloaded. Spare sidings were built to disperse trains and hide them from German aerial reconnaissance.

[Question] Railroad workers, river hands, and the people working for sea transportation were not considered direct participants in the fighting, but their work was also linked with deathly danger. Please tell us about this.

[Answer] It was 1942. Stalingrad. German aircraft were bombing ships and dumping hundreds of mines into the river, including electro-magnetic mines. From 23 August, after the Nazis had penetrated to the Volga, river-navigation was halted. Almost all fuel supplies were destroyed. Blazing oil burnt the port's moorings. Supplying the troops defending Stalingrad became even more complicated. Bringing up people and supplies along the roads of the right bank became impossible. Now, all hopes were pinned on the left bank and on the ships of the Volga Military Flotilla which was made up mostly of refitted river boats.

Work at the crossing points went on under the enemy's uninterrupted fire. The steamer Nadezhniy, commander by Capt A. Shivarev, was leading a ferry. During one of its crossings with wounded soldiers on board, the steamer, shelled by heavy motors, began to burn. The captain maneuvered his ship from under the

shelling. The crew rushed to extinguish the flames and patch up the shell holes. The lives of the wounded soldiers were saved.

The commander-in-chief of the 62nd Army, V. I. Chuikov, appraised the significance of the crossings and the role played by the Volga river hands with the words: "If it had not been for them, it is possible that the 62nd Army would have perished without ammunition and food supplies..."

During the Battle of the Kursk Salient, engineer Ye. Chukhnuk was assigned the urgent mission of getting a military train with tanks to Kursk. The courageous woman drove her train through a bombing attack and accomplished her mission in an excellent manner. She was awarded the title of Heroine of Socialist Labor. Engineer I. Shurupov of the Liska depot was seriously wounded during a trip, but he did not leave his train; instead, he brought it to its destination.

When the Germans were besieging Tallinn, Baltic transportation vessels overcame mine barriers, the strikes of enemy aviation and torpedo boats, and maintained contact with the city. The steamer Saule was seriously damaged by bombs and machine-gun fire as it approached Tallinn; it ended up on a sandbar near the tip of Gogland Island. Fascist aerial attacks continued one after another. Nevertheless, the crew, commanded by the first woman ship commander in the world, Capt A. Shchetinina, repaired the vessel, brought it off the sandbar and safely to Leningrad.

Allied convoys made their way through northern seas to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. It was a dangerous and difficult route, but still the shortest. During one of its journeys at the end of May 1942, the crew of the Soviet motor ship, Stariy Bolshevik, and its captain, I. Afanasyev, displayed heroism and self-sacrifice. Enemy planes were attacking without interruption. The damaged and burning ship fell behind the convoy. The fire burned towards the ship's onboard explosives. The commander suggested to his crew that it abandon ship, but the sailors continued their struggle to save the military cargo. The fire was extinguished. The Stariy Bolshevik caught up with the convoy and delivered its cargo to its destination...

The episodes I have told you about confirm one more time: railroad workers, river hands, sailors and all our transportation workers were in the same formation with the soldiers of the armed forces. I named only a few, but there were hundreds of thousands, millions of glorious wartime workers.

[Question] While retreating, the enemy destroyed transportation facilities and communications; he blew up bridges, sea moorings and river ports; he put railroad stations out of commission. Our forces, however, needed more and more weapons, ammunition and replacements as they drove the Hitlerites to the west...

[Answer] We worked day and night. Following the attacking forces were the transportation facilities restorers who, together with the people from the liberated cities and villages, raised from the ruins those facilities which had been destroyed and built new ones. Altogether, during the war, 10,000

kilometers of rail lines and 5,000 kilometers of road were laid. We restored 117,000 kilometers of railroad, 16,000 bridges, hundreds of airfields and thousands of stations and halts.

The prominent military leader Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov said more than once that only the skilled utilization of all types of transportation can give an army that mobility which is necessary for attaining victory. The experiences of the Great Patriotic War confirmed this truth.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

VINOGRADOV ON U.S. EXERCISES ON OKINAWA

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "In the Role of a Participant"]

[Text] Okinawa has again become the arena for the Pentagon's military exercises. Exercises involving U.S. marines have been concluded with a large amphibious assault landing on this Japanese island. Two thousand marines, the helicopter carrier "Tarawa" and other ships from the U.S. 7th Fleet, and elements of the American Air Force took part in the final landing operation.

In all, during a ten-day period, more than 3,000 marines, some of which were transferred to Okinawa from the Hawaiian Islands, worked through tactics of seizing sections of a sea coast. At the same time, exercises involving the U.S. Air Force's military transport took place on Okinawa. Following this, marine exercises in field artillery firing took place on the Camp Hanson Firing Range. It should also be added that all the American Air Force bases on Okinawa are working at full capacity, since they are being used to transfer American soldiers taking part in the huge American-South Korean maneuvers "Team Spirit-85".

It is well known that the American units billeted on Okinawa have been assigned the role of a strike force for the protection of so-called "vital American interests" on the Asian continent. It is not an accident that all types of exercises carried out here are, as a rule, offensive operations. Okinawa itself is considered a "trampoline" from which American troops can "jump" to wherever needed. Okinawa is also considered a "transit point" in the transfer of troops from Pacific Ocean and mainland bases to the Asian continent. This has been particularly borne out in the "Team Spirit-85" maneuvers, where American units are being transferred via Okinawa not only from the Hawaiian Islands and Guam but also from the United States.

The role prepared for Okinawa by the Pentagon must worry the public. In fact, it means that American intervention against an Asian country could begin from Japanese territory and Tokyo would then become an accomplice to and even a participant in aggression. As the Japanese press has pointed out, the "plan

of cooperative military operations between the armed forces of the U.S.A. and Japan", which was adopted at the end of last year, provides a mechanism for the direct involvement of Japan, under the command of Washington, in armed conflicts in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean region.

That is why the numerous military rehearsals conducted by the Pentagon on Okinawa in particular and on the Japanese archipelago in general are so dangerous.

12877

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1 May 1985

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON U.S. NAVAL ACTIVITY IN MEDITERRANEAN

LD271140 Moscow TASS in English 0945 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Text] Moscow March 27 TASS--"The 6th Fleet, said to be the most combat ready unit of the American General-purpose Naval Force, is the chief tool of U.S. imperial policy in the Mediterranean," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes today.

"The 6th Fleet is often described as America's sailing gendarme," the article says. "People remember the atrocities committed by the gendarme off the Lebanese coasts, when 406-mm guns of the battleship New Jersey sowed death and destruction on Lebanese soil. Armed provocations were carried out on several occasions against Libya. American carrier-based aircraft impudently intruded into the airspace of that sovereign country."

The "strategic alliance" between Washington and Tel Aviv gave a fresh impetus to gendarme actions of the U.S. 6th Fleet. Last December, for the first time, the navies of the two countries carried out joint shows of force in the Eastern Mediterranean.

"Peace is particularly endangered by the immense concentration in the Mediterranean Sea of American nuclear weapons," the newspaper stresses. "According to the PAESE SERA newspaper, 576 nuclear munitions are currently stored on Italian territory. The lion's share is intended for use by the American Navy in the Mediterranean."

"Besides, ships of the U.S. 6th Fleet possess their own nuclear weapons. Special transports in the Mediterranean also carry stocks of nuclear weapons. Marine units are also armed with nuclear weapons."

"Stepping up the activity of its 6th Fleet, the United States is complicating the atmosphere first in one, then in another part of the Mediterranean," the article says. "But the policy of U.S. nuclear adventurism in the Mediterranean Sea faces the firm determination of the Soviet Union and other freedom-loving states to prevent nuclear conflict and turn the Mediterranean from an arena of military-political confrontation into a zone of lasting peace and cooperation."

CSO: 1812/199

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA SCORES PENTAGON BROCHURE

PM041029 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 85 First Edition p 3

[TASS Report: "Pentagon Falsification"]

[Text] Washington, 3 Apr -- The Reagan Administration has resorted yet again to malicious slander of the Soviet Union in an attempt to justify its unprecedented militarist preparations. The Pentagon has issued a new edition of the brochure "Soviet Military Power," whose authors strive to demonstrate the "growing threat from the USSR." Acting according to the principle: The more monstrous the lie and the more often it is repeated, the easier it is believed, the disinformation experts from the CIA, the Pentagon, and the State Department have chosen once again a quite simple method for "proving" the intensification of the "Soviet threat." They have resolved to ascribe to the Soviet Union everything that the United States itself is doing to whip up the arms race in an attempt to wreck the prevailing strategic parity and achieve military superiority over the USSR.

It is worth noting that these crude efforts appear each time the administration needs a new portion of the great lie in order to hide its plans for an arms buildup and the pursuit of its aggressive inclinations in the international arena. The direct aim of the present work is first and foremost to justify the dangerous plans announced by the Reagan administration for the militarization of space, which are intended to give a powerful new boost to the arms race. The brochure devotes a special section to this question, in which its compilers give full voice to Reagan's "star wars" program, declaring that by the start of the Nineties the Pentagon will be able to embark on the creation and production of experimental models and tests of components of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. In so doing they involuntarily expose the hypocrisy of Washington's reassuring assertions that the Reagan "star wars" program is purely a "research" project and that it is allegedly "premature" to talk about its deployment.

Observers are also devoting attention to the fact that the anti-Soviet falsification has been launched soon after the start of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. Someone in Washington would obviously like to poison the atmosphere at the talks and complicate the achievement there of mutually acceptable and effective agreements in the arms limitation sphere and particularly the adoption of effective measures to prevent the militarization of space.

The authors of the ANTI-SOVIET brochure would also like to scare U.S. NATO allies with the imaginary "soviet threat," hitch them more closely to the militarist U.S. policy of confrontation, and involve them in the implementation of the U.S. plans to militarize space. As experience shows, the anti-Soviet falsification will also be widely used to "brainwash" the U.S. public and whip up anti-Soviet hysteria and a militarist neurosis in the country. In particular, Pentagon "fixers" will use it to push through Congress record military appropriations amounting to almost \$323 billion in the next fiscal year.

CSO: 1801/189

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

CRITIQUE OF BRITISH DEFENSE SECTOR

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 85 p 3

[Article by M. Belyaev: "Who Benefits from the Arms Race?"]

[Text] It is difficult to name a major or minor armed conflict virtually anywhere in the world where, if British soldiers were not actually deployed, British weapons were not used. Never, however, has the fly-wheel of Great Britain's arms race revolved with such great speed as now.

In just a few years, from fiscal year 1978/79 through fiscal year 1984/85, military allocations have been increased by 27 percent and the military budget has reached an unparalleled sum of 17,033 billion pounds sterling. Great Britain is not only fulfilling, but overfulfilling U.S. and NATO demands for an annual 3 percent growth in military budgets. However, even such growth rates for expenditures on military purposes are regarded by certain British circles as insufficient.

Thus, British Defense Minister M. Hazeltine recently revealed a new 20-year military program which would "cost" 360 billion pounds sterling. Central to this program is the equipment of British naval forces with the U.S. "Trident" missile; 11 billion pounds sterling are being allocated for this purpose. The mass production of "Harrier" aircraft, tank modernization and the creation of new types of conventional weapons are also envisioned.

The question involuntarily arises as to why a country, suffering from economic disorder, allows itself to divert such major resources to the arms race. A not too insignificant role in the growth of Britain's military might is played by the ambitious plans of conservatives who dream of the former greatness of the British Empire and are striving to play a leading role in the West. Washington's instigative actions are also making their contribution to the expansion of Great Britain's military preparations. However, the arms race depends to a considerable degree on the egoistic activity of Britain's military-industrial monopolies.

For those who make a living out of dealing in blood, governmental orders for armaments shipments make up the original "gold mine." After all, work on the military arsenals signifies not only increased incomes, but also a guaranteed market for sales, one which is not dependent on the fluctuations of a market's

economic state. The British publication LABOUR RESEARCH reported that during an economic decline in a majority of sectors and a fall in profits for a majority of companies, only the firms engaged in military production "were experiencing a boom." The companies Ferranti, Raical Electronics, Plessey, Marconi-Elliott and some others belong to the list of weapons smithies which receive the largest orders for arms shipments and thus have the largest profits. Aircraft construction corporations also make substantial profits.

The largest supplier of aerospace armaments is the British Aerospace Company. The state established it in 1977 and it soon became a major weapons producer. The company's profits from the sale of aviation equipment and, to an even greater degree, of missiles and space instruments, depend almost totally on defense ministry orders. Approximately one-eighth of the government's military expenditures goes directly to this company.

The abovementioned companies are basically engaged in military business. Similarly engaged are such industrial giants for which armaments production makes up only a portion of their basic operations. Take, for example, British Leyland, IKI and British Petroleum. They, like others, do not pass up an opportunity to get their own share of the profits from the production of the instruments of death. Thus, virtually not a single major military project gets off the ground without the participation of the electronics company, General Electric, even though it does not belong to the military-industrial corporations formally.

Several dozen of the largest monopolies grab the basic bulk of defense ministry orders and, correspondingly, the largest piece of the fat. However, approximately 5,000 small and medium-size firms are drawn into armaments production through the system of subcontracting. Overall, a considerable portion of Britain's industry works for the defense ministry: 45 percent of the production of the aerospace sector goes for military purposes, 30 percent of shipbuilding, and 20 percent of the electronics industry.

By holding powerful positions, military corporations stimulate in every conceivable way the state's activities directed at the arms race and exert decisive influence on the formation of government policy for military affairs. The close ties of industry with military circles and the state bureaucracy are also extensively utilized. Essentially, we are talking here about the activities in Great Britain of a military-industrial complex with many branches.

The published British monogram "The Elite and the Power in British Society" deals with the close coordination between the monopolies and the ruling clique. The monogram notes that "the directors of the industrial companies are the creme de la creme." The monogram's authors stress that the offices of the monopolies are directly connected to the corridors of power.

Many weapons concerns include in their boards of directors former officials of the military department, e.g., retired generals and admirals, who have not lost the "necessary" connections which guarantee the pushing forward of

military orders. Rolls-Royce, Raical Electronics, Ferranti and other companies turn regularly to the services of retired military men. Thus, in 1982, the most highly paid director of Raical was R. Brown, a man who formerly held a prominent post in the defense ministry. The company estimated his services to be worth 1,275,000 pounds sterling.

Perhaps Britain's military corporations hire such "specialists" only for insurance. After all, the majority in Parliament is made up by "their" people, people who know themselves what to do. Out of 315 conservative Members of Parliament who occupy no ministry posts, 157 hold 355 directorships in various firms, while 105 are "consultants" in 219 companies. LABOUR RESEARCH reports that former Prime Minister George Callahan, while looking at several Members of Parliament, got lost in conjecture: "Whose interests do they represent? Do they act according to their duties, or do they defend their own personal interests and the interests of their friends?"

With the advent to power a few years ago of the conservatives, who traditionally protect the interests of big capital in the British aristocracy, the role of the military-industrial complex in the militarization of the country has grown even greater. The profits of military corporations have also increased. In 1982-1983, the defense ministry paid out to its contractors 6.8 billion pounds sterling; 60 percent of the payments were made according to estimates which would ensure exceptionally high incomes. The military-industrial complex became one of the instigators of the Anglo-Argentine War over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. During this adventure, the military corporations wanted to demonstrate the capabilities of their production. However, the main incentive for the war was the news, which had slipped through, about the large oil reserves in the region; the corporations wanted to control these reserves.

In trying to please big business, the Tory government returned formally nationalized corporations to private hands. Controlling shares of the Ferranti firm were auctioned off, as was a major part of British Aerospace. Afterwards, it was the turn of British Shipbuilders. It is a feature of this process that it included primarily the most lucrative corporations. Commenting on the intention to return through sale to private hands the firm Royal Ordnance Factories, a producer of infantry weapons, LABOUR RESEARCH reported that its previous year's profits of 68.2 million pounds sterling appeared to be a good lure for buyers.

The irrepressible appetites of the military-industrial complex are satisfied primarily at the expense of and unburdened by expenditures for social needs. Today, the gun kings of Great Britain insist on reducing such so-called "government services," excluding, of course, military expenditures.

However, it is not the arms race which can ensure the growth of international authority, the development of stable business relations with other countries, and the strengthening of nations' security. Recent events testify to the fact that an understanding is growing in official British circles that the

new spiral to the arms race, as designated from across the ocean, and especially its spread to outer space, threatens to turn Great Britain into a simple appendage of Washington's military-political machine. Under these circumstances, the military-industrial complex is finding it harder to force a course on the country favorable to it.

12247

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

TASS COMMENTATOR CRITICIZES FRG POLITICIAN'S REMARKS ON DRA

LD212255 Moscow TASS in English 1235 GMT 21 Mar 85

[Article: "Herr Todenhoffer's 'Afghan Card'"]

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS--TASS commentator Lev Aksyonov writes:

Juergen Todenhoffer, FRG Bundestag deputy from the Christian Democratic Union, has been quoted by the DPA agency as "urging the Soviet Union to allow a neutral International Red Cross commission to investigate freely into the situation in Afghanistan."

This MP from the ruling party has already long displayed much interest in the events in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Moreover, the DPA recalls, that "in recent years he has repeatedly visited the resistance movement in Afghanistan" (as the agency euphemistically describes the gangs of murderers sowing death and destruction in that long-suffering country). The report makes no mention of how such "visits" were made. It was a comparatively short time ago that Todenhoffer boasted having visited Afghanistan illegally from the territory of neighbouring Pakistan together with counter-revolutionary bandits. Indeed, an uneasy conscience betrays itself. It is worthwhile demanding "a free investigation," but its subject should be totally different.

For example, how does an MP of a country maintaining diplomatic relations with the DRA dare penetrate its territory secretly, and together with bandits? And not only penetrate it, but also boast this for everybody to hear?

Since here Todenhoffer is so much concerned with Afghanistan, he could be expected to demand a "free investigation" into such crying violations of norms of international law, as the use of neighbour Pakistan's territory for the training of terrorists killing working people, burning down schools and mosques and poisoning water wells in Afghanistan. Or how does the red carpet reception given on the banks of the Potomac to the chiefs of counter-revolutionary bandits who get there not so much moral, but, which is the main thing, weighty military aid, tally with the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

It is apt to recall that in the fiscal year of 1985 the U.S. congress has earmarked 2809 million dollars for these purposes. Doesn't the Bonn MP know about that? It is also apt to recall the massive supplies of arms with the "Made in

the USA" trade mark to counter-revolutionary bandits, the numerous American "Instructors" training Afghan counter-revolutionaries in the "art to kill." As far as Todenhoffer's demagogic calls to the Soviet Union are concerned, this "zealot of human rights" should know that the limited Soviet military contingent stays in the DRA in conformity with the norms of international law, at the request of that state's legitimate government. But what did Todenhoffer look for in Afghanistan when he crossed into its territory under cover of night and accompanied by such "fellow-travelers?" One thing is clear, this initiative of the CDU figure is a fresh attempt at building up "psychological warfare" against the DRA, against the Soviet Union.

CSO: 1812/199

1 May 1985

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

NATO'S EXPANDED 'OPERATIONAL ZONE'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 85 p 5

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "The Threat to the Nations of Africa"]

[Text] The African press is sounding the alarm: the increasing activity of the Pentagon is acquiring ever greater threatening parameters for the continent's nations. One of the manifestations of this is the inclusion by Washington of NATO in its intrigues in Africa. The Nigerian newspaper VANGUARD made reference to the fact that the United States and NATO currently include the entire continent in their operational zone. Actually, under pressure from U.S. representatives, the participants of a winter series of conferences involving the highest military-political agencies of the bloc approved a number of special measures which the bloc nations must undertake in the event the United States sends its forces, stationed in Western Europe, to the Middle East or Africa.

It is not difficult at all to imagine with what such "readiness" on the part of Pentagon and NATO circles is fraught for the peoples and countries of Africa. After all, such attempts have always been made, and made more than once, and the United States has not been the only country to make these attempts. Let us recall how in 1978 and 1979 France, Belgium and the United States acted jointly to suppress the national disturbances in the southern Zaire province of Shaba. Recently, France and the United States intervened militarily in the internal affairs of Chad in order to maintain their puppet Habre and his anti-people's regime in power.

We are also attracted by the fact that the Pentagon and NATO are assiduously enmeshing the continent with a web of bases and other military facilities. Morocco and Sudan, Egypt and Djibouti, Somali and Kenya, as well as a number of French-speaking countries in Western and Central Africa are part of this incomplete list of African states on whose territory imperialist outposts have already been built or are being hurriedly built. They also have to be regarded as potential "transit points," which can be utilized for moving interventionist forces from the United States and other NATO countries to any region on the continent.

Incidentally, the earmarking of these bases for exactly this purpose was confirmed during the Bright Star maneuvers which have been conducted by the

Pentagon already several times in Northeast Africa, on the territory of Somalia, Egypt and Sudan. We will also mention that during the recent maneuvers of the West African Training Cruise exercises, the Pentagon, for the first time, conducted assault landing operations on the West African coast when it employed combat vessels, helicopters and naval infantry. The Congolese newspaper ETUMBA wrote that the United States and NATO were rehearsing aggressive operations against African states.

Even the interventionist U.S. Rapid Deployment Force is earmarked for operations in Africa. This force, which carries the latest equipment, can be dispatched to any region where, as the White House calculates, U.S. "vital interests" are threatened. It is no accident that 19 independent African and Asian states, against their will, are included in the area of operations of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); it is this command which controls the Rapid Deployment Force.

Following in the footsteps of their senior partner, U.S. NATO allies, i.e., France, Great Britain and Italy, have also organized special police forces earmarked for "quick operations." Moreover, Great Britain has already utilized its mobile forces during the Falkland Islands crisis, and France has done likewise with its intervention in Chad.

The anxiety of independent Africa is also bring about a strengthening of the military alliance between the United States and the Union of South Africa. The Pentagon and NATO regard the racist state as the "17th member" of this aggressive bloc. They are aggressively expanding their military cooperation with the apartheid regime by giving it the role of supporting imperialism and neo-colonialism on the continent.

Such facts are evidence that there are real reasons for alarm among African society with regard to the stepped-up militaristic activity of the forces of imperialism in Africa. The Pentagon and NATO are expanding their interference, including military interference, in the affairs of the continent's nations. Such a perspective cannot help but cause independent Africa to be on its guard.

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AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW REPORTS BRAVERY OF TROOPS SERVING IN DRA

LD292003 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0815 GMT 26 Mar 85

[From the "Yunost" program]

[Excerpt] Fulfilling the international duty. Moments occur in the life of each of us when in just a few fleeting seconds you must summon up all of your will and strength for some purpose and show what you are capable of, show your character. This happens most often in so-called extreme situations far removed from our ordinary everyday life when it seems that a sort of completely different time-scale comes into being, when you are on your own, face to face with danger, sometimes deadly danger. We want to tell you about one such situation. [passage omitted]

The dushmans, or to be more precise, those who command them, needed a helicopter, at any price, a helicopter with red stars shot down, and captured airmen. The dushmans counted on transporting them along hidden paths to Pakistan so that the masters of psychological warfare from the U.S. special services who have been patronizing the basmachs for over 5 years could try to draw the morally and physically tortured Soviet people into a base anti-soviet farce which our ideological opponent needs so much today.

There is much work in Afghanistan for helicopters with red stars on their sides. The roads in the young republic are still very bad and there are few of them, so that there is no better way for delivering freight to remote regions than by helicopter. Helicopters have to play the role of ambulance when someone in a mountain village is dangerously ill and has to be taken urgently to a hospital, and the role of meteorologist and fireman. In Afghanistan today helicopters are used to delivering post and medicines, foodstuffs and clothing, school equipment and even fertilizers for agricultural cooperatives hidden in the mountains.

The dushmans, it seemed, had worked it all out. They chose an area, where, according to their observations, our aircraft fly particularly frequently. They sought out a space for an anti-aircraft gun and painstakingly camouflaged its thick black barrel with branches and grass. They placed observers on the ridge. After this, so as to carry out their order, they only had to wait.

Lieutenant Zhernov was linked by all subdivisions, for his open and happy character, his invariable claim, his constant readiness to come to a friend's aid. When Vladimir went up to a group of soldiers or officers, it seemed that it was becoming warmer roundabout from the broad smiles. [passage omitted]

At the college his close friends gave him the fond nickname of Ginger. He was called this also by Aleksandr Kashin, a college friend of Zhernov with whom it chanced that the lieutenant was fulfilling his international duty in Afghanistan. [passage omitted] On that day they were flying as a pair as always. In front was the helicopter of Major Kashin with the number 26 on the side. Behind came Lieutenant Zhernov's helicopter with number 24 on its side. Aleksandr Kashin did not hear the shots which hit his comrade's helicopter because of the roar of the motor of his helicopter. He simply saw no. 24 being flown by his friend Volodya Zhernov, his Ginger, emitting smoke and beginning to fall into a mountainside. [passage omitted]

The most important thing was clear immediately. The crew of the other helicopter were not badly injured, they landed all right and only had slight injuries.

Then flight engineer Warrant Officer Zazulya grabbed Major Kashin's arm: Comrade Major, look. There, behind, where the jagged summits disappeared into the sky, dushmans were running toward the fallen helicopter. There were about 70 of them. [passage omitted]

The members of the crew of helicopter no. 24 were practically hauled into the cabin of Major Kashin's combat helicopter. The last to appear in the hatch, when the helicopter was already going up to a height safe from the dushman's bullets, was the smoke-blackened face of Vladimir Zhernov. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [unidentified reporter] If you had not managed to lift them off the mountainside, what would have happened to the lads?

[Kashin] They would have been taken prisoner. And it would hardly have been possible to save them, of course. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Did you realize that you could have been shot down as well?

[Kashin] I did not give it any thought. Of course, I could have been shot down. We saw a lot of basmachs. They were just on another slope about 800 meters away.

[Reporter] When you went to help, did you receive orders or did you act according to circumstances?

[Kashin] I was simply fulfilling my civic duty. To lose my friend would have been the greatest loss in my life.

[Reporter] Were you afraid?

[Kashin] No I was not afraid. What is there to be afraid of when you are fulfilling your duty? [passage omitted] [end recording]

So ended this incident from the life of two friends, helicopter pilots Major Aleksandr Kashin and Lieutenant Vladimir Zhernov; in a short duel in the mountains at a height of 2.5km where a few Soviet people clashed with a specially trained gang of 70 basmachs and emerged victorious. Because no matter what factors our opponents take into account they can never fully understand how much strength there is in our character, how brave and firm our people are at moments of danger, how seriously we take the word duty, and how we spare nothing to fulfill it.

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